[cowofzot]

Montgomery barely beat the Germans at El Alamein, and the outcome of the battle was hardly “decisive” since the German forces in North Africa were not destroyed. Monty also did not beat an Axis force that was anywhere near the peak of its strength. Rommel was critically weakened by his failed end-around the Alamein position, where he impaled his force on the British at Alam Halfa (incidentally, the British defenses were laid out according to Auchinleck's plans). Practically out of fuel, Rommel was forced to accept positional warfare, on the defensive. Despite the weakness of the Germans, Monty's attack went badly and was a close-run thing. Only with the early committment of his armor was Monty able to punch through the German lines. The fact that he nearly bagged the German forces was due more to Rommel obeying (briefly) Hitler's ill-advised "stand fast" order.



The subsequent "pursuit" of Rommel's forces was badly handled and lacked vigor. It was a faiulre, not a victory, particularly since in North Africa more than anywhere else it was the destruction of the enemy that mattered, not taking territory. At this time, Monty enjoyed total sea, air, land, and logistic superiority. With ULTRA, he also knew that he had such superiority. This means his short hooks were excessively timid, his failure to try very hard to cut off the Germans by sending stronger forces across Cyrenaica via Mchili-Msus-Agedabia is extremely disappointing (he only sent a thin screen of armored cars), and his pause in front of Al Agheila to prepare for a set-piece battle reveals a distinct lack of vigor.



http://www.uni.edu/~licari/monty.htm


A growing number of authors have demonstrated that the British army in World War II was not that good. It started out badly and hardly, if at all, improved during the course of the war (see Heginbotham's MIT security studies paper, and subsequently in the May/June 2000 edition of Military Review; Hart in Clash of Arms; French in Raising Churchill's Army, Place in Military Training in the British Army).



His plans at El Alamein, the Mareth Line, Sicily, Normandy, Market-Garden, and Veritable all were complex or flawed, and the British army performed badly in each.

[Potemkin]

This has been known about for a long time. Years ago, I heard a WWII veteran who fought at El Alamein describe Montgomery as a "mad mascot" rather than a serious general. He was basically just an upper-class twit who got lucky a couple of times (and then got unlucky again during Operation Market Garden).

[Smilin' Dave]

Montgomery barely beat the Germans at El Alamein, and the outcome of the battle was hardly “decisive” since the German forces in North Africa were not destroyed.

As I've pointed out to you in another thread, being decisive doesn't always mean destroying your enemy. A decisive result only has to have a significant impact on the outcome of the campaign. After El Alamein Rommel was on the strategic defensive, every attack after this point was a counter to the rapidly deepening crisis the Axis were facing in North Africa. That's a pretty decisive turn of events.

Monty also did not beat an Axis force that was anywhere near the peak of its strength.

War is very rarely fought by equals. Why is it Rommel is lionised for winning with disadvantages, but when the British win it's waved off as 'material supremacy' or Rommel's 'shortages'? Why is Rommel so rarely criticised for conducting long ranged and large scale offensives against a foe with material advantage and increasing skill? Oh I forgot, the Germans were supermen of WWII and everyone else only beat them by accident/cheating.

The subsequent "pursuit" of Rommel's forces was badly handled and lacked vigor. It was a faiulre, not a victory, particularly since in North Africa more than anywhere else it was the destruction of the enemy that mattered, not taking territory.

It was a victory in the sense that the opposition was forced to retreat to a bridgehead with little chance of escape. It also chewed up German and Italian troops who could have fought elsewhere. The idea that position means nothing in the desert is laughable. Again, as has been explained to you in another thread, North Africa was still a war focused around control of logistic infrastructure like roads, ports and even water sources. If capture of territory meant nothing, why was Rommel even on the offensive in the first place? Why does he get praised for victories that didn't decisively destroy the British in North Africa? Once again a different metric is being applied to the allies.

A growing number of authors have demonstrated that the British army in World War II was not that good.

This isn't much of a revelation. People have been going on about this since WWII itself. IIRC even Churchill complained about the adulation for Rommel. In fact it's more revisionist and radical to defend Montgomery and the British army than to denounce it.

[cowofzot]

As was explained to you before, I didn't write it.

[Smilin' Dave]

As was explained to you before, I didn't write it.

So why did you post it if I can't respond to it (which is two questions really)? Potemkin agreed with the thing and didn't garner the same response.

Also, can I take the opportunity to direct your attention to this:
viewtopic.php?p=398224#p398224

Copy and pasted articles with little or no original comment by the posting user will be deleted.

[cowofzot]

Why not? obviously an interesting conversation piece, you took an interest in it.

It's obvious you have some beef with myself likely over Lend Lease or some recent topic, perhaps save that for yourself instead of wasting board space with it. Get over it, PM me & I'll mail you a Pippi Longstocking movie for X-mas to help soothe your frayed nerve endings.

[Smilin' Dave]

Why not? obviously an interesting conversation piece, you took an interest in it.

And your response to that was to end discussion by saying "but I didn't write it!". So we can we have a conversation, solely around agreeing with the author? Given that the author has little to say that is notable or original, this is hardly a piece that could hope to provoke interesting discussion, if you wish to avoid opposing views.

It's obvious you have some beef with myself likely over Lend Lease or some recent topic, perhaps save that for yourself instead of wasting board space with it. Get over it, PM me & I'll mail you a Pippi Longstocking movie for X-mas to help soothe your frayed nerve endings.

I don't like your posts because they are of low quality. You don't even format them properly, and seem to resist doing so. This is particularly disappointing because I think you have great potential as a poster. You clearly have a lot of knowledge and have some capacity to be analytical.

Honestly if I took every ill informed, poorly argued, opinion in this sub-forum personally I would have quit long ago, so I wouldn't flatter yourself with thoughts that this is personal. It's professional.

[pugsville]

The British Army was coming from a long way back in ww2, argueable more behind the pace than they were in ww1. A collection of Regiments more than army, it had to rapidly expland , adapt to new way of warfare and develop new weapons. France was over before they could learn anything other than they had a lot to learn. The Desert was a side show, composed of 50% commonwealth troops and collections of regiments. There were not in continual instense combat like the russians or themselves in ww1. I think they did improve through the war. The American and British forces were winners and have most likely missed out on a searching analysis and criticism. They had the luxury of numbers, supplies, equipment, air and sea superiority and safe bases (once they were involved in a major front).

[cowofzot]

A conversation soley on agreeing with the author? How do you arrive at such bizarre conclusions? Of course not.

& the personal stuff again is against the rules for starters & I realize you're still hot about losing previous arguments, but I must add that posting such doesn't paint you in an intellectual light. Stick to thread material & make you're arguments without stooping down into personal stuff.


Position in the desert is different to other theaters, Tobruk can be bypassed as many other locales were, but take the Ukraine for example, the Donetz basin has to be taken & held as it contains the coal & minerals deposits, bypassing it gains less for the attacker. Ports were very important in the desert, but much of it was a vast wasteland. Ploesti another example. Or Norway, you couldn't have seesaw battles running back & forth up & down as was the case in the desert because of the nature of the terrain.

[Smilin' Dave]

I won't be participating in your apparent vendetta further. So back on topic:

Tobruk can be bypassed as many other locales were, but take the Ukraine for example, the Donetz basin has to be taken & held as it contains the coal & minerals deposits, bypassing it gains less for the attacker.

This isn't a fair comparison. Tobruk is a single built up town/fort, the Donetz basin was a whole region. A better comparison would be between Tobruk and the fortress city of Brest in the opening days of Barbarossa. Neither was readily bypassed and required the devotion of significant resources.

Rommel did indeed attempt to bypass Tobruk once, and it turned out to be a mistake. Not only did this mean he couldn't use its port for resupply, he had to leave troops behind to keep the troops in the garrison inside. IIRC they may still have been able to disrupt supplies. While Rommel's troops subsequently won the next field battle (Operation Battleaxe), they were ultimately forced to withdraw due to the logistical strain and added imbalance in numbers created by having troops stay behind to beseige Tobruk (Operation Crusader). The second time around Rommel made a point of taking Tobruk quickly and with all of his forces.

Comparing Operation Crusader with the breakout from El Alamein also illustrates why the second battle is considered decisive. After Crusader, Rommel's forces were pushed back but not beaten. They would return and push deep into Egypt. After El Alamein, the Axis forces were pushed back (ultimately to Tunis) and kept there. After El Alamein, Axis defeat in North Africa became a forgone conclusion.

[cowofzot]

Tobruk was not the sole area mentioned. The desert as a whole was also mentioned. Ukraine has loads of farms spread out over a large area. & Allowing Germans to fall back to Tunisia extended the war in Africa. A message was decoded where Rommel mentioned he was down to 50 tanks & Monty did not finish him. Which is the point of the article, his poor performance.

[Smilin' Dave]

Tobruk was not the sole area mentioned. The desert as a whole was also mentioned.

The example you used for the North African campaign was Tobruk, and my point about Tobruk showed how bypassing a strongpoint effected battles further down the line. The more I think about it the more I can't see the comparison to the Ukraine/Donetz region. In Ukraine troops at least had some hope of living off the land and were generally not constrained at the strategic level by geographic features. In the desert all units were heavily dependent on limited water sources, or the trucks that delivered it (and thus, roads). Then add in features like the passes fought over during Battleaxe, or the Qattara Depression, and it seems that comparitively speaking, Ukraine was a much more open battleground. There was more to be gained economically from the Ukraine, but those constraining features in the deserts of North Africa dictated the fighting. Given the strategic reason for fighting in North Africa was strategic rather than economic resources (Suez Canal and Italian possessions respectively), the importance of taking and holding key points on the map becomes even more apparent. The 'cauldron' created by Rommel at Gazala is a more operational scale example of the limitations of mobility in North Africa, notably in that case the barrier seperating Rommel's advance forces from the body of the army was man made, particularly minefields.

Allowing Germans to fall back to Tunisia extended the war in Africa. A message was decoded where Rommel mentioned he was down to 50 tanks & Monty did not finish him. Which is the point of the article, his poor performance.

But the author proves this by denying that the battle of El Alamein was decisive, which in light of the territory permanently lost and the strategic shift forced on Rommel it clearly was. It could have been even more decisive by the completely destruction of Rommel's forces, absolutely. I won't say that Montgomery was a good general but some of the the criticisms the author makes appears to be unfounded.

[cowofzot]

I would point out that keeping Rommel out of Egypt was so he didn't get the oil, so it was very much about resources, hence economic.

[Smilin' Dave]

The oil you refer to was primarily in the Middle East rather than North Africa. Hitler sent German divisions to support the Italians in North Africa primarily to prop up an ally and to sap British resources. This is apparent from Rommel's more defensive objectives when he first arrived in theatre. While a more economically driven strategy was proposed by some (although the main focus remained striking a blow against Britain), it does not appear to have been adopted. The British on the other hand were worried about losing the naval base at Alexandria and access to the Suez canal, which would have significant implications for their empire. So for both sides, North Africa was strictly about strategic assets rather than economic gain.

[cowofzot]

Yes, familiar with where the oil was.



the loss of Iran and Iraq would have meant that the area's oil, the lifeblood of mechanized warfare, would flow into Axis tanks, planes, and ships, rather than those of the Allies.



In early 1942 the key to Allied control of this vital region lay in Egypt.

http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/egypt/egypt.htm

[William_H_Dougherty]

The Armies of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, aswell as the United States, were never able to win a battle with the Germans on equal terms. Ever.

Only after they gained overwhelming artillery and air superiority were they able to, painfully, exact victories from the Germans.

As for the quality of Monty, I've always thought Auchinleck was superior. Monty was a decent but overly cautious general. However, considering the British Army seemed incapable of winning battles against the Germans with even 2 to 1 superiority in manpower and superior equipment, I'd probably be cautious too.

- WHD