[cowofzot]

Read the title. & 1st post, Schnorkels have nothing to do with engine alloys. Nor does Enigma. If you feel a compulsion for denigration, please at least be clever about it. So far, double bagels.

[MB.]

I'm afraid I cannot fathom how technological determinism is unrelated to a thread positing entirely technical explanations for causal events (in this case, nazi defeat).

nowhere did I state Germany lost the war specifically or exclusively because of technological reasons

In which case, I am to presume that you are intrinsically fascinated by the shortcomings of nazi technology? But by no means do you consider yourself a determinist?

No more one liners or personal attacks people - SD

[cowofzot]

Quote;
I'm afraid I cannot fathom how technological determinism is unrelated to a thread positing entirely technical explanations for causal events (in this case, nazi defeat).

Never stated it was unrelated, nor did I state it was the entirety of causal reason for Nazi defeat.

As to being a determinist, again I have no interest in your strange psychological profiling. If you have something related to the topic to share, please do.

Not fascinated with shortcomings of Nazi technology either, rather in the different pathways available using the available materials & means at the time.

[Smilin' Dave]

Panther tank begun in 37. French & Russians were well ahead of Germany in medium tank design circa 1940-41. As it was the Panther was still being de-bugged in 44.

This seems highly unlikely. First, the Panther was a response to Soviet medium (and according to some, heavy) tanks, so it would be particularly difficult to have in invented independently, never mind several years earlier. If the Wehrmacht had somehow turned up with Panthers in say, 1940, they would have had so few tanks they might have lost the Battle for France. A Panzer I might be a bit rubbish, but it was cheap to produce and could be built at a wider range of existing factories. Further we could expect an earlier production model of the Panther to have more bugs. If I recall they were notoriously unreliable and prone to catching fire when deployed in 1943, neither feature would endear them to Germany's high command.

The lack of a good all rounder tank for the Germans in the early years of the war can be ascribed to production limitations and doctrine. Germany, like many other nations in this period, believed that tanks would be heavily divided by their role on the battlefield. So infantry support, exploitation/rapid movement etc. This didn't just gell with the armour theorists, but it also suited more traditional military figures, who might not want an army dominated by tanks, but could see the utility of vehicles that slot into existing formations like an armoured support for the infantry, or a fancy armoured car. On the production side of things the Nazis were just badly organised and interventionist which isn't a good combination. On the other hand they basically twisted the whole economy to advance rearmament. I some respects the Germans were lucky to start the war with the forces they had, a more conservative hand might have slowed the process down.

[cowofzot]

It's true Panther was a response to T-34, but again the French had larger tanks in 1940, therefore the existence of such is not unusual.

Panther like the T-34 & Sherman did catch fire, it's true. Doesn't make it obsolete or unusable. Mobility was fabulous.

As to numbers, that's a good point. Took longer to make a Panther than it did a Mk III Panzer.
I doubt they would have lost battle of France though, ardennes would have turned out the same with either tank, probably better with Panther if anything.




Dmitriy Loza
For a long time after the war I sought an answer to one question. If a T-34 started burning, we tried to get as far away from it as possible, even though this was forbidden. The on-board ammunition exploded. For a brief period of time, perhaps six weeks, I fought on a T-34 around Smolensk. The commander of one of our companies was hit in his tank. The crew jumped out of the tank but were unable to run away from it because the Germans were pinning them down with machine gun fire. They lay there in the wheat field as the tank burned and blew up. By evening, when the battle had waned, we went to them. I found the company commander lying on the ground with a large piece of armor sticking out of his head. When a Sherman burned, the main gun ammunition did not explode. Why was this?

Such a case occurred once in Ukraine. Our tank was hit. We jumped out of it but the Germans were dropping mortar rounds around us. We lay under the tank as it burned. We laid there a long time with nowhere to go. The Germans were covering the empty field around the tank with machine gun and mortar fires. We lay there. The uniform on my back was beginning heating up from the burning tank. We thought we were finished! We would hear a big bang and it would all be over! A brother's grave! We heard many loud thumps coming from the turret. This was the armor-piercing rounds being blown out of their cases. Next the fire would reach the high explosive rounds and all hell would break loose! But nothing happened. Why not? Because our high explosive rounds detonated and the American rounds did not? In the end it was because the American ammunition had more refined explosives. Ours was some kind of component that increased the force of the explosion one and one-half times, at the same time increasing the risk of detonation of the ammunition.


http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/ar ... 28759.html

[Smilin' Dave]

It's true Panther was a response to T-34, but again the French had larger tanks in 1940, therefore the existence of such is not unusual.

Even the French didn't field anything resembling a proto-MBT. Their Char-2B was impressively big, but it was slow and armed for infantry support. Their Somua-35 had a main armament unsuited for use against infantry, but by the standard of the time was reasonable for anti-tank work (IIRC it still wasn't that fast). The British of course had their infantry and cruiser tanks. It wasn't until the Panzer IV was upgraded considerably that the Germans had a good middle of the road tank, similarly the Sherman was a fairly late advent. The early T-34s certainly had the 75mm gun, but it was shorter on the early models and thus had lower muzzle velocity. Ironically the all rounder status of the T-34 probably wasn't intended, instead it aimed to streamline production by replacing two classes of vehicles (the T-28 style medium support and the BT series cruiser types).

I doubt they would have lost battle of France though, ardennes would have turned out the same with either tank, probably better with Panther if anything.

The Panther was prone to breakdowns on long advances etc. and was hard to maintain in the field due to being highly engineered. Both could stall the advance, leaving the western Allies time to recover from the initial shock.

[cowofzot]

Panzers also had breakdowns on long marches. Real bad in early campaigns, Austria, Cezchlosovakia & Poland & on into France. Late model Panthers had many of the problems worked out, hence my mention of it having an origin of 1937 to as to give some time to work out these bugs.



The B1-bis was the main battle tank of the French army in 1940

http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/fran ... Heavy.html







The average operational rates for the primary German AFV's on the western front in 1944 were: Pz. IV=71%; Panther=65% and Tiger=65% (Jentz).

Also Guderian; In 1944, 5 March he reported that, "...with the exception of minor deficiencies, the Panther is at last front ripe"

and I.Abteilung/Panzer Regiment 1 reported "In its present form, the Panther is troop ripe. It is far superior to the T-34 tank. Almost all the bugs have been worked out. This Panzer has exceptional armament, armor, cross country travel ability and speed... Motor failures have decreased...The steering gear and transmission have proven to be acceptable." (Jentz).

http://community.discovery.com/eve/foru ... 8811952268

[cowofzot]

In March 1938, the German Army marched into Austria, experiencing a mechanical breakdown rate of up to thirty percent.

http://yawiki.org/proc/Panzer_I



the Polish campaign. During the campaign no less than a half of Germany's tanks were unavailable due to maintenance issues or enemy action,




The German armor sustained substantial breakdown rates making it impossible to ascertain the exact number of tanks disabled by French action. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/ent ... _of_France


See if I can find a percentage for Polish & French campaigns.

[Smilin' Dave]

Still can't use the edit button I see

Your points about existing problems with German tanks breaking down are a bit redundant because:
1. It doesn't indicate anywhere how long it took any of these vehicles to get 'back on the road'. A vehicle that can be fixed on the spot is superior in some circumstances to one that needs a fully equipped shop.
2. Your figures from Jentz show that in 1944, when the bugs are supposed to getting ironed out, the Panther still had lower operational rates compared to other vehicles. In other words, more Panthers will make it worse.
3. As already noted, an earlier Panther (if it somehow became possible) is probably going to have more bugs, so the longer lead in time won't help.

And you are still avoiding the simple issue that nobody had actually conceived of the Panther yet, and there was little reason for them to do so. The 'accident' of the T-34 wasn't well known and certainly wasn't ready for 1937. Nobody has proper tank warfare experience prior to 1939, only a few smallish outtings. For example the Panther isn't going to occur to someone because of the Spanish Civil War, in fact the Wehrmacht might have been more inclined to rip off the T-26 if they thought Spain were a great lesson. At this point debating the Panther in the early war isn't too far of MB's lasers and nanotech, it's just impossible.

The B1-bis was the main battle tank of the French army in 1940

Numerically it was vastly outnumbered, so not main in the sense of general use:
http://ww2total.com/WW2/History/Orders- ... r-1939.htm
365 Char B1s (no idea is they were all the bis model), vs. say, 500 S-35s or the horde of 1,600 R-35s (a light infantry tank).
Your own link also notes that the B1 was fairly slow, knocking down the other definition of a Main Battle Tank: An MBT is supposed to be mobile.

[cowofzot]

And you are still avoiding the simple issue that nobody had actually conceived of the Panther yet, and there was little reason for them to do so.

Yet the idea of larger tanks HAD been concieved in German military circles. & larger tanks in French & Russian inventories did exist at this time. They were not unknown or unconcieved quantities. How could there be no reason for them to do so when they actually did work on the concept? & breakdown rates of tanks is significant for Panzers in the same way it would be for Panthers.

Char was slow, yes we know, but these things are developing at the time. & French didn't have the same style of battle as Germans did. No Blitzkrieg of "fast" tank warfare for them.




Development of the Tiger had begun in Spring 1937
http://www.battle-fleet.com/pw/his/tige ... y_tank.htm


it was envisioned even then, in the late 1930’s that a bigger, heavier tank would be needed in the future. Designed to be a breakthrough tank,

http://www.suite101.com/content/german- ... -i-a180809



Germany certainly had options as to what sort of tank force to build in the 30's in the same way it had options regarding it's navy. It settled on the Z plan, but could just as well made a huge sub fleet, or concentrated on making pocket battleships like Graf Spee or build the giants. Coulda built carrier/destroyers. These are what if's & within the parameters of doability.


& with the Panther debut at Aug 43, it took about a year to correct most of it's faults, ( final drive excepted). That's not bad really. If it were built starting 37, by 1940, it coulda been a decent machine.

An eighth crankshaft bearing was added beginning in January 1944 to help reduce motor failures.[23]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_tank

[cowofzot]

K V 1 tanks built 38-39 & weighed 45 tons, just a tad more than Panther.

KV-1 Model 1940
Designed 1938–39
Weight 45 tonnes

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kliment_Voroshilov_tank

So again, feasibility not in question.

[Oxymoron]

1. Dont make an Alliance with Italy.
2. Dont declare war on the US after Pearl Harbor
3. Never start the Holocaust (This would give more manpower, more hearts and minds, and brain power)

[cowofzot]

Inistitute the 24 hour factory system starting 1939 & put women to work.

Build Opel 4X4 & 6X6 truck factories in Poland, France, Belgium etc.

Build carriers & follow Wegeners plan of taking Faroes, Shetlands & Iceland. There's a hot one for ya.

[Smilin' Dave]

Yet the idea of larger tanks HAD been concieved in German military circles. & larger tanks in French & Russian inventories did exist at this time. They were not unknown or unconcieved quantities. How could there be no reason for them to do so when they actually did work on the concept?

A Panther is not just a bigger tank. The Tiger is just a 'bigger tank'. The Panther represents a whole different outlook, even the armour was structured differently.

Char was slow, yes we know, but these things are developing at the time. & French didn't have the same style of battle as Germans did. No Blitzkrieg of "fast" tank warfare for them.

The French probably had more light tanks than the Germans. Further, the German's first attempt at a heavy tank was very similar to the Char
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neubaufahrzeug
Not only does this emphasise that the two were not that far about in doctrine, but that there was no reason for the Germans to dream up the Panther.

Development of the Tiger had begun in Spring 1937

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Design_history
The 'Tiger' of 1937 looked nothing like the finished product. Apparently it was similar in appearance to the Pz III and was intended to the infantry support-style armament later seen on the PzIV. Never mind the idea was shelved until the Germans actually encountered other heavy tanks. Which again emphasises how improbably it was for the Germans to suddenly decide to build a proto-MBT.

KV1....So again, feasibility not in question.

The Soviets didn't start rolling out the KV-1S, the more mobile version, until later in the war. Further the earliest KV tanks from memory mounted the same short 75mm gun I've been pointing to as an infantry support weapon, rather than a well-rounded armament (the longer barrelled 75mm guns later seen on the late model PzIVs, Sherman and T-34).

Since we can pretty much dispense with your concept of an early Panther, and thunderhawk already deflated the tyres a bit on the Enigma machine idea, I'll have a go at your final suggestion, schnorkels for submarines.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 89/REN.htm
http://www.uboat.net/men/training/preparations.htm
Both of these links look at the development of German submarines in the interwar period, at the time you hope the Germans will twig to the advantages of schnorkels.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schnorkel
This covers the history of the device itself. Let the record show the Germans actually tried out the schnorkel... in 1916. The same article shows some of the early difficulties in the use of the device, which might suggest why it wasn't taken up.

So the key reasons an 'early schnorkel' are unlikely are:
1. The Italians, having played with it in 1926, dumped it after a few years. This suggests issues with the system and reduces the 'window' in which it could hypothetically be discovered. Indeed it seems it was only a later Dutch project that managed to come to their attention.
2. The necessity for a clandestine submarine arm limited German training/development in U-boats quite drastically. It seems from the first two links there was a real shortage of skilled submariners, making it even harder to test out new technology.
3. The clandestine submarine program was largely being run as an export business by Krupp, so any prototype has to have sale value... and will eventually be given to someone else. This blows the cover of the operation and/or limits how much the engineers can play with the device.

Now on to your new three:

Inistitute the 24 hour factory system starting 1939 & put women to work.

Would run counter to Nazi desires (and expectations) for a short war that didn't weigh to heavily on the public, threatening a repeat of the revolts that speeded the end of Germany in WWI. Never mind the gender politics.

Build Opel 4X4 & 6X6 truck factories in Poland, France, Belgium etc.

Requires re-tooling factories which is costly, and requires a level of organisation that the Nazis lacked. If they could agree on mass-truck production I suspect any number of other more serious problems would fade. Oh, except for fuel shortages that crept in a various points of the war.

Build carriers & follow Wegeners plan of taking Faroes, Shetlands & Iceland. There's a hot one for ya.

Let's ignore the technical problems the Germans had with carrier warfare development, like lack of experience. How would the Germans build a carrier without encouraging the British to get onto a war footing sooner? Why wouldn't the British surface fleet walk all over this? Are you planning to cut into the U-boat program, the surface fleet (making a Royal Navy beating more likely) or the limited land forces to pay for this?

Over to you Oxy:

1. Dont make an Alliance with Italy.

Is actually a very valid point. I can't think of any strong reason for the Germans to side with Italy, it all seems to come down to personality politics and ideology... neither of which make for good decisions. Instead involvment with Italy succeeded in making everything worse.

2. Dont declare war on the US after Pearl Harbor

I've discussed on another thread recently I don't think this would necessarily be that big of an impact, but YMMV.

3. Never start the Holocaust (This would give more manpower, more hearts and minds, and brain power)

The Holocaust proper started after the brain drain etc. I suppose if you meant precursors like the Nuremburg laws you certainly have a point.

[William_H_Dougherty]

1. Dont make an Alliance with Italy.

That turned out worse for Italy than Germany if you ask me. Provided Germany with a distraction for the British for 4 years, and bogged down significant numbers of Allied forces in easily defensible terrain for the rest.

Instead involvment with Italy succeeded in making everything worse.

Italy made decisions that were bad for Italy. Consider this; if Italy had not made an alliance with Germany, the Kingdom of Italy would still exist today. If Germany had not made an alliance with Italy, Germany would have made the same mistakes during the battle of britain, same mistakes in russia...

In other words, they would *probably* (can't say for sure) have lost the war, so I'm not sure this deserves to be on your list.

Now, if we were talking World War One. Austria-Hungary and Italy were poor allies definately. One because of poor quality troops, the other because they didn't take the alliance seriously.

- WHD

[cowofzot]

Build carriers & follow Wegeners plan of taking Faroes, Shetlands & Iceland. There's a hot one for ya.

Let's ignore the technical problems the Germans had with carrier warfare development, like lack of experience. How would the Germans build a carrier without encouraging the British to get onto a war footing sooner? Why wouldn't the British surface fleet walk all over this? Are you planning to cut into the U-boat program, the surface fleet (making a Royal Navy beating more likely) or the limited land forces to pay for this?



Germans had no desert warfare experience either, but did fairly well at it.

War footing? British were leagues bigger than German Navy, no such thing as being on a war footing with Germany. British fleet didn't walk over German surface vessels, no reason to think the outcome would somehow be different vs carriers. German navy would've done well to have a couple carriers for Norway invasion.

Build carriers instead of Bismark & Tirpitz.

[cowofzot]

Build Opel 4X4 & 6X6 truck factories in Poland, France, Belgium etc.

Requires re-tooling factories which is costly, and requires a level of organisation that the Nazis lacked. If they could agree on mass-truck production I suspect any number of other more serious problems would fade. Oh, except for fuel shortages that crept in a various points of the war.


They had a level of organization to have JU 52's built in France, trucks would be easier.

Junkers Ju 52
In France, the machine had been manufactured during the war by the Junkers-controlled Amiot

http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Junkers_Ju_52





ME 210's built in Hungary.


mention should be made of the Me 210C, a version of the earlier model which was built in Hungary by the Danube Aircraft Factory. Messerschmitt had supplied jigs and tools, and a new factory had been built for production when the German decision to stop its own Me 210 program was made. The Hungarians nevertheless decided to proceed and one of the pre-production Me 210A-0s had been fitted with 1,475 hp (1100 kW) DB 605E engines as a prototype for the Me 210C. The engines were licence-built by Manfred Weiss.

http://www.pilotfriend.com/photo_albums ... %20210.htm

[MB.]

Build carriers instead of Bismark & Tirpitz.

[Germany] settled on the Z plan, but could just as well made a huge sub fleet, or concentrated on making pocket battleships like Graf Spee or build the giants. Coulda built carrier/destroyers. These are what if's & within the parameters of doability.

Build carriers & follow Wegeners plan of taking Faroes, Shetlands & Iceland. There's a hot one for ya.

Hilariously this would actaully have given the Nazis even less of a chance of defeating the Royal Navy. Your notion about German fleet developments is completely ridiculous and founded entirely on mistaken technological determinist assumption that inherently carriers must be superior to battleships.

[cowofzot]

Bs. Founded on bs. Battleship had it's day. Japanese demostrated that early against the British.

The growing range of engagement led to the battleship's replacement as the leading type of warship by the aircraft carrier during World War II.

http://schools-wikipedia.org/wp/b/Battleship.htm


Not to mention airpower sending the RN off at central Norway 1940. Carriers would only add to that.

[MB.]

nm