[pikachu]

Assuming that ceasefire is made in 1944 and then the Soviet Union collapses into some civil war or something, neutralizing its potential as a strategic threat, IMO the Allied invasion would not have happened in Western Europe for some long time. The Italian front would probably stalemate south of Rome with both sides amassing large numbers of troops there, strategic bombing and rocketing would continue on both sides, as well as Atlantic naval skirmishes, but no decisive progress would be made one way or another. The US would refrain from using a nuclear bomb against Europe, but it would nonetheless make sure to demonstrate and propagandize its potential. As the conflict drags on and no progress is made, war exhaustion will rise on both sides, eventually a ceasefire will be signed. If this happens before the Germans get a bomb of their own, the ceasefire terms will probably favor the Allies, but I can't tell what exactly they would entail.

This is an intuitive assessment based on how much trouble the Allies historically had DESPITE the majority of the German forces being committed to the Eastern Front. If I recall correctly, Normandy landings barely worked, and in 1945 the Germans actually mounted an offensive which came close to dealing a huge blow to the Allies. Without the Eastern front, the Germans would be much better prepared for the landings and it just wouldn't work, so nobody would be crazy enough to try it.

[Tailz]

One thing that has occurred to me because of this discussion thread so far. Is the change in mentality that griped the Germans over the holding of captured foreign lands as compared to the First World War. Correct me if I am wrong here, but the Germans were quite willing to give up land won in battle because they had spent the bulk of the war fighting over territory that was not German - thus giving up non-German soil was not a loss in their view - thus defences could be flexible because they were not attached to losing a given patch of dirt or some hill. I estimate the mentality would have changed had that hill been inside Germany. In turn this lead the French to fight themselves white to regain the captured territory from the Germans. This mentality seems to have come a complete 180 degrees by the Second World War, where countless foreign captured cities were declared Festung cities to be held to the last man and the last bullet.

Am I far off with this theory?

[William_H_Dougherty]

Am I far off with this theory?

I don't know. In the mindset of the German leadership (a.k.a. Hitler and Co.), they were fighting over "Greater Germany" which extended to the Urals (so really they were fighting over territory that they considered part of their empire).

In addition, the nature of the war was just so different. Hitler gets a lot of criticism for ordering Soviet-style "not-one-step-back" defences, but in some of those cases it was probably the right decision (e.g. December-January 1942) and, while this caused tremendous loss of life, was better than the alternative (a complete rout) in some cases.

By the end of the war it was stupidity, of course. The Soviets generally bypassed the Festungs (some of the pockets behind enemy lines were quite large and lasted up until the end of the war) and concentrated on beating the germans at the front.

- WHD

[pikachu]

orrect me if I am wrong here, but the Germans were quite willing to give up land won in battle because they had spent the bulk of the war fighting over territory that was not German - thus giving up non-German soil was not a loss in their view - thus defences could be flexible because they were not attached to losing a given patch of dirt or some hill.

IIRC the German peace plan in 1940 included withdrawal from western europe but not poland.

[Tailz]

In addition, the nature of the war was just so different. Hitler gets a lot of criticism for ordering Soviet-style "not-one-step-back" defences, but in some of those cases it was probably the right decision (e.g. December-January 1942) and, while this caused tremendous loss of life, was better than the alternative (a complete rout) in some cases.

I have to disagree that permitting the Heer to give up terrain would have resulted in a rout - the German army steadfastly fell back and regrouped on many fronts in the face of overwhelming enemy activity. The one thing that props up almost every time I read the memoirs of German officers who had to deal with these "Not one step back" orders was their desire to relocate to terrain that was better suited to defence, to maintain mobility instead of being tied down to locations that were of little strategic importance or had lost their tactical strength because the position was outflanked (or worse, about to be surrounded).

[Potemkin]

The one thing that props up almost every time I read the memoirs of German officers who had to deal with these "Not one step back" orders was their desire to relocate to terrain that was better suited to defence, to maintain mobility instead of being tied down to locations that were of little strategic importance or had lost their tactical strength because the position was outflanked (or worse, about to be surrounded).

Indeed. Ironically, Hitler's "not one step back" policy probably accelerated the German defeat in 1945.

[William_H_Dougherty]

Indeed. Ironically, Hitler's "not one step back" policy probably accelerated the German defeat in 1945.

Yes, that is pretty well established and even mentioned in my OP. However, would you say the same for December 1941? Are you suggesting Directive Number 39 was in err?

It is pretty well established THEN that the Heer was on the verge of a rout, and that DN #39 played an important role in keeping the Germans in the fight.

- WHD

[Siberian Fox]

Improbability of this scenario aside, Germany could not win.

Even if Germany somehow keeps military and resource production going despite complete loss of air superiority, even if they somehow fortify all Atlantic and Mediterranean beaches and ports to the point of 'impregnability'. It was not beyond Britain and America to do something dastardly like invading neutral Spain. Most likely via leaning on Portugal to extend it's military co-operation to allowing Allied forces to land on the continent there.

Britain and American were only interested in unconditional surrender, and would stop at nothing to get it. Also, post-war the U.S.S.R. would have been strategically worse off and denied German rocketry technology.