[William_H_Dougherty]

#1. fuser, what you say (as you admit) is completely inplausible in 1944. Early 1943, just previous to Kursk, it is slightly more plausible.

#2. With all do respect, I think the people who think the Allies would prevail are ignoring some tremendous political considerations.

From a materialist point of view, you are all correct that the Allies are completely out-producing the Axis come 1944. However, the reality is that Allies at no point in the war showed that they were able to beat Germans on equal terms. From the deserts in Africa, to the Hills of Italy, to hedges of Normandy, the Allies only prevailed with overwhelming air superiority, superior numbers, and superior weaponry.

The reality is Normandy (on the scale it was planned) is just not going to be successful if you add the 150 or so German divisions that were fighting on Eastern Front to this theatre, ESPECIALLY considering the eastern front troops by and large were higher quality and better trained than most units in the east (especially during D-Day).

So, with the atomic bomb, with years of out producing the Germans, the political situation being equal, is it plausible the allies prevail? Plausible yes, but the political situation would not be equal. What if the Normandy invasion was wiped out? Even WITH the Russians knifing their way to Warsaw at that time there would have been HUGE political consequences.

So it is a crap-shoot as far as I'm concerned. If the Allies can hang in there, maybe they win. I doubt, despite my love for the British Empire and Churchill and Spitfires, etc. etc., that they would in the face of any serious setbacks (i.e. being pushed out of Italy, again VERY plausible with a dozen or so eastern front divisions with some level of mechanization).

- WHD

P.S. Also consider that the Germans had a very impressive military research complex, they might not (probably not) have had the atomic bomb, but think of what just four full squardons of Me 262s could do to air superiority in the West.

[JohnRawls]

Tell me , how do you keep 150 divisions near the shoreline with air planes bombing you and naval artilery pounding your ass all the time ?

[MB.]

n/m

[Smilin' Dave]

Dont forget that the German scientists captured in Germany sped up the Atom Bomb.

Second, the Germans could retailate with Chemical weapons using V2 rockets against Britain.

IIRC the western Allied atomic bomb project was largely driven by local scientists, given that the German scientists were not collected till relatively late in 1945 when the project was coming to completion.

While the Germans could have used chemical warfare, let's not forget the western Allies had something of an edge in biological warfare. So in addition to nukes you might see German cities seeded with Anthrax or similar. Which really adds to the jolly picture Europe is becoming in this scenario.

Ugh.

Smilin' Dave?

He kind of has a point. While the western Allied generals weren't hopeless, their strengths tended to be at the strategic level, where their material advantages counted for the most. Particularly for a sea-borne invasion, this material advantage is both important and offset. It is important in that theoretically a big enough beach head could not be over-run. On the other hand the restrictions it imposes on movement (both battlefield and logistics) and the way it limits what forces can be employed as various stages, could offset the strategic advantages. We probably shouldn't rule out the possibility of the Allies finding some way of using their startegic assets to make a breakthrough though. Sea power still counts for something if nothing else.

I doubt, despite my love for the British Empire and Churchill and Spitfires, etc. etc., that they would in the face of any serious setbacks (i.e. being pushed out of Italy, again VERY plausible with a dozen or so eastern front divisions with some level of mechanization).

I've been thinking about the Allied position in Italy in this scenario. I think the relatively close terrain of Italy, the possibilities of naval support of ground operations and the size of the foothold by early 1944 would make it defensible, even with added German troops. The Allies would only have more incentive to prop up the Italian theatre if the Soviets dropped out. Without D-Day (and later landings in Southern France) to soak up resources, and with the need to keep the Germans stretched out as far as possible to have any hope of winning, Italy only becomes more important.

P.S. Also consider that the Germans had a very impressive military research complex, they might not (probably not) have had the atomic bomb, but think of what just four full squardons of Me 262s could do to air superiority in the West.

IIRC the Axis were heavily dependent on resources in the conquered territories for wonder weapons like the Me 262,and I think their local supply of Uranium wasn't too great either. Me 262 engines built without certain alloys had a high failure rate. I think continued trade with the Soviets can be ruled out unless Stalin is feeling both vindictive and stupid.

Thought for you all: where does this leave the Eastern Axis states like Hungary and Romania? Are they more or less content with the Axis situation with the end of the Eastern Front?

Oh, and does this have any impact on Franco at all? I'm not familiar with the man, but would he make a deal with the Allies?

[Oxymoron]

IIRC the western Allied atomic bomb project was largely driven by local scientists, given that the German scientists were not collected till relatively late in 1945 when the project was coming to completion.

You will admit that they sped up the process?

While the Germans could have used chemical warfare, let's not forget the western Allies had something of an edge in biological warfare. So in addition to nukes you might see German cities seeded with Anthrax or similar. Which really adds to the jolly picture Europe is becoming in this scenario

This would become a M.A.D situation, I dont think the British would like to die horribly for the French. I dont think the Atom bomb would have secured a dominant victory in Europe, I think there would be a ceasefire in exchange for perhaps Norway.

[fuser]

Tell me , how do you keep 150 divisions near the shoreline with air planes bombing you and naval artilery pounding your ass all the time ?

And why you think Germans would had tried to repel the invasion at the beaches only.

Then, look at the example of omaha beach and put more divisions there and no way Allies would had prevailed there. You don't win war just by the air superiority. Take the example of monte casino now, it took numerous offensive to break through gustav line even though with complete air superiority.

No doubt Germans divisions would had suffered heavy causality but are you implying that entire German divisions would had been wiped out just by Bombers.

[William_H_Dougherty]

Tell me , how do you keep 150 divisions near the shoreline with air planes bombing you and naval artilery pounding your ass all the time ?

I would imagine that #1. the coastal defenses would be strengthened with larger quantities higher quality troops with better equipment, but that another force would be deployed farther inland. In many ways, the von Rundstedt and Rommel plan both had their pros in cons. With perhaps a third of the Eastern Front forces remaining as border guards, the OKW would have had more than enough manpower and equipment to implement BOTH plans in france.

Two Side Points: Firstly, the Naval Bombardment did not prove sufficient to break the back of the (relatively) poor quality units that served as shore garrisons (I fail to see why Ostfront veterans with better equipment would fair worse). Secondly, air superiorty proved very effective at destroying motorized, mechanized, and armoured columns moving up from the interior of france to the front, but were of limited assistance AT the front for obvious reasons.

I've been thinking about the Allied position in Italy in this scenario. I think the relatively close terrain of Italy, the possibilities of naval support of ground operations and the size of the foothold by early 1944 would make it defensible, even with added German troops. The Allies would only have more incentive to prop up the Italian theatre if the Soviets dropped out. Without D-Day (and later landings in Southern France) to soak up resources, and with the need to keep the Germans stretched out as far as possible to have any hope of winning, Italy only becomes more important.

If the purpose of the war is to "win it ", I seriously doubt that Italy gets prioritized in absentia to a secondary and tertiary landing in France. Why? Because you are absolutely right, Italy is VERY defensible, and it gets worth the farther north you get (Allies going to push through the Alps?).

It served Hitler's long-term purposes for the Allies to get bogged down in Italy (e.g. the entire purpose of the Afrika Korps was to delay the Allies in Libya, so that resources were soaked up that would otherwise be committed to a landing in Europe).

IIRC the Axis were heavily dependent on resources in the conquered territories for wonder weapons like the Me 262,and I think their local supply of Uranium wasn't too great either. Me 262 engines built without certain alloys had a high failure rate. I think continued trade with the Soviets can be ruled out unless Stalin is feeling both vindictive and stupid.

Depends on the peace arrangement met with Stalin. It is unlikely that Hitler is ever going to agree to a peace which didn't see Germany's borders enhanced. It would be tantamount to admitting that he had just murdered millions of his own people for nothing.

Thought for you all: where does this leave the Eastern Axis states like Hungary and Romania? Are they more or less content with the Axis situation with the end of the Eastern Front?

Hungary yes (at least the Cabinet, not so much Horthy), Romania I'm uncertain. Depends on the peace arrangement and if they get back the territories taken from them by the Soviets in the 1930s.

Oh, and does this have any impact on Franco at all? I'm not familiar with the man, but would he make a deal with the Allies?

Franco makes no deal with either side. The time that made the most sense for him to enter the war was 1940 around the same time Italy did. Like Italy, Spain could not sustain a long war and had mixed loyalties re: England and Germany. Unlike Italy, Spain had a leader who knew both.

No doubt Germans divisions would had suffered heavy causality but are you implying that entire German divisions would had been wiped out just by Bombers.

This implication goes against what actually happened in the war. The Germans had lost air superiority in virtually all theatres by 1943 yet still fought on for 2 more years. They had virtually no air impactful air presense in 1944 but, but were somehow able to delay a superior sized and better equipped army and avoid being completely wiped out in Normandy. Why? Because air superiority definately impacts an offensive campaign of the enemy, but much less so impacts a defensive one. The "destruction from the air" in Normandy actually happened mostly when Germany was counter-attacking, not when they were on the defensive (why? because it is hard for planes to see armour and troops hiding in houses, under trees, or in the hedges).

Regardless, the logic that the Normandy Campaign would have gone better if the Germans were more numerous, of better fighting quality, and better equipped is bizarre. Also, virtually entire Luftwaffe would have been concentrated in the region. The allies gaining air superiority is still probable but it is slightly a more difficult task now.

- WHD

[Smilin' Dave]

You will admit that they sped up the process?

No. Looking at a list of people who worked on the Manhattan Project I can't see a single German scientist captured in 1945. A lot of scientific projects were boosted with the capture of German scientists, but the atomic bomb project wasn't one of them, and in fact I don't think there would have been a single WWII era project that would have benefitted, because those scientists were captured at the end of the war, rather than during it.

If the purpose of the war is to "win it ", I seriously doubt that Italy gets prioritized in absentia to a secondary and tertiary landing in France.

I think you misunderstand what I meant. I don't think that the Allies would expand the Italy front into a 'proper' second front, but rather be more inclined to maintain it, even if the Germans had more troops to throw at it, because of its global strategic value to them.

e.g. the entire purpose of the Afrika Korps was to delay the Allies in Libya, so that resources were soaked up that would otherwise be committed to a landing in Europe

This seems unlikely. If the German strategic plan was to bog down troops in distant and isolated theatres, wouldn't they have deployed fewer of their own troops to theatres like Greece? It also doesn't entirely make sense that the Germans sent more troops to the Afrika Korps once they were on the defensive in Tunsia, in effect once the Allied troops were already bogged down.

Depends on the peace arrangement met with Stalin. It is unlikely that Hitler is ever going to agree to a peace which didn't see Germany's borders enhanced. It would be tantamount to admitting that he had just murdered millions of his own people for nothing.

If we take early 1944 as the time to reach a ceasefire, and we accept for the purpose of this exercise that both sides must agree to the ceasefire, then I think Stalin's opinion on matters might be more important than Hitler's. By early 1944, Hitler doesn't really have much to bargain with that the Soviets cannot take. Army Group South (or whatever it was called by then) had essentially been knocked out during Kursk and the following Soviet offensives. All eyes are on Centre, which is in a very precarious position as Operation Bagration would go on to demonstrate. Strategically the Germans are on the defensive, and when they are not on the strategic defense they are retreating. The Axis cannot make a deal at this point on the strength of their position, because their position is pretty dire.

Franco makes no deal with either side. The time that made the most sense for him to enter the war was 1940 around the same time Italy did. Like Italy, Spain could not sustain a long war and had mixed loyalties re: England and Germany. Unlike Italy, Spain had a leader who knew both.

I'm not so sure. When Hitler asked Franco to join in the war, Franco didn't outright reject it but instead asked for significant infusions of aid as well as military equipment. Unlike the Axis, the Allies have buckets of material to give away (especially since I can't imagine the Soviet Union will continue to get their Lend-Lease in this scenario), but what they need is a front. In exchange for profligate material incentives would Franco allow Allied troops to "reinforce" his border with Axis-controlled France? It is unlikely, but not beyond the realm of posibility.

[JohnRawls]

And why you think Germans would had tried to repel the invasion at the beaches only.

Then, look at the example of omaha beach and put more divisions there and no way Allies would had prevailed there. You don't win war just by the air superiority. Take the example of monte casino now, it took numerous offensive to break through gustav line even though with complete air superiority.

No doubt Germans divisions would had suffered heavy causality but are you implying that entire German divisions would had been wiped out just by Bombers.

Because the chances of defense the germans really have against America and CO under this scenario is to not let them land (defend the beaches) or drive them into the sea. Which both requires them pushes through naval artillery bombardment and air bombardment and prolly fighting the allied troops at some point.

As soon as the allies get on the continent , they would just outproduce germany and flood them , the same way the russians did if we don't take the nuclear bomb into the account.

I would imagine that #1. the coastal defenses would be strengthened with larger quantities higher quality troops with better equipment, but that another force would be deployed farther inland. In many ways, the von Rundstedt and Rommel plan both had their pros in cons. With perhaps a third of the Eastern Front forces remaining as border guards, the OKW would have had more than enough manpower and equipment to implement BOTH plans in france.

Two Side Points: Firstly, the Naval Bombardment did not prove sufficient to break the back of the (relatively) poor quality units that served as shore garrisons (I fail to see why Ostfront veterans with better equipment would fair worse). Secondly, air superiorty proved very effective at destroying motorized, mechanized, and armoured columns moving up from the interior of france to the front, but were of limited assistance AT the front for obvious reasons.

I disagree , the bombardment did what it needed to do , it moved all armored division away from the coast and holding the beaches without armor and driving the allies back in to the ocean prooved to be impossible. Hence they weren't destroyed also.

[soron]

I once read an article in a magazine about the first nuclear bomb, and that initially, it was planned to drop it over Hamburg in Germany. The end of the war in Europe before the bomb was ready prevented that from happening, so it was dropped over Japan instead.

[Thunderhawk]

Regarding an upgraded defence at the beaches: how would the Germans do that? Their Eastern Front didnt consume huge amounts of structural steel and cement (though it did consume some). The Atlantic wall was made with what was available and what could be redirected for it. Additional German soldiers stationed there would not create more cement and steel. The existing fortifications were undermanned and they could be packed with more troops, but they did have limits. Several extra infantry divisions along the Normandy-Calais region could be absorbed without problem, but armour and more troops would require new facilities. Building new forts and armoured sheds for tanks and personal would have been a huge construction task. Such large projects during early '44 when the allies were already gearing up for invasion would have invited bombing. In the event that the Germans would have completed several fortified facilities the act of construction would have scarred the environment well enough to make their location known. Construction of individual pill boxes could be concealed, but not armoured tank sheds and bunkers. If the excess added divisions arent placed in facilities but hide near by, then their existence and rough location would be given away by their logistics support train. The more troops that are stationed there, the more food and supplies that have to be hauled to them and that will be noticed. Either way, more targets to bomb.

Finally, if there was peace with the Soviet Union in '44, that doesnt mean the Soviets or the Germans would move all their troops from their new border - both would guard it and do so heavily given that both leaders arent the kind that would trust the other's word. How many divisions could actually be moved out? How much construction resources would be diverted to new facilities in the East rather then upgrading the Atlantic wall?

[fuser]

Because the chances of defense the germans really have against America and CO under this scenario is to not let them land (defend the beaches) or drive them into the sea. Which both requires them pushes through naval artillery bombardment and air bombardment and prolly fighting the allied troops at some point.

Most of the German generals won't agree with you, veterans like rundesdt and guderin. Their plan would had actually allowed allies to gain a foothold on beaches. And I will bet my money on them rather than any armchair general.

I disagree , the bombardment did what it needed to do , it moved all armored division away from the coast and holding the beaches without armor and driving the allies back in to the ocean proved to be impossible. Hence they weren't destroyed also.

No, you are wrong, The bombardment didn't forced Germans to move their armor away from the beaches, it was precisely the plan. What fucked up their armor was scarcity of oil.



Finally like most of the WWII scenarios, I think this is an unrealistic one too.

[William_H_Dougherty]

I think you misunderstand what I meant. I don't think that the Allies would expand the Italy front into a 'proper' second front, but rather be more inclined to maintain it, even if the Germans had more troops to throw at it, because of its global strategic value to them.

Perhaps; although the political ramifications of getting bogged down in Italy (i.e. "maintaining it" as you put it) are large. Seems to me the Allies circa 1944 were anxious to bring about a major strategic defeat of Germany on mainland Europe, and that would have gotten the priority.

Which is why the Italian Front circa 1944 suddenly loses priority.

This seems unlikely. If the German strategic plan was to bog down troops in distant and isolated theatres, wouldn't they have deployed fewer of their own troops to theatres like Greece? It also doesn't entirely make sense that the Germans sent more troops to the Afrika Korps once they were on the defensive in Tunsia, in effect once the Allied troops were already bogged down.

Well, the Germans actually didn't want to invade Greece period. Also, the Axis troops that were stationed there were also of relative low quality. For example, the 164th "Light" Division, which virtually disintegrated upon contact with the Allies after being transferred to afrika from greece.

Tunis? By the time they were defending "Tunis", the United States had entered the war, landed in Algeria, and was pushing on the Axis forces from the West (while the British 8th Army, etc. was pushing in from the East). The Afrika Korps and Italian Armies were facing virtual annihilation at this point unless they recieved signifcant reinforcements.

You don't have to trust me on it, trust Rommel. He had his "falling out" with Hitler over this very issue.

The Axis cannot make a deal at this point on the strength of their position, because their position is pretty dire.

Which is why, in Hitler's sick and twisted logic, a "cease-fire" would never happen. The belief was that Germany had to regain the initiative and then conclude a peace that wouldn't undermine the "regime".

In other words, when Hitler was winning the war he didn't want a "deal" because with a little more effort he could annex half the Soviet Union. When Hitler was losing the war he didn't want a "deal" because with a little more effort they could change the tide.

That is the problem with gamblers, there is always a bigger pot.

I'm not so sure. When Hitler asked Franco to join in the war, Franco didn't outright reject it but instead asked for significant infusions of aid as well as military equipment.

That was Mussolini's technique in 1939, ask for impossible amounts of aid. Franco couldn't exactly say "I'm not coming to the aid of the two powers which made a nationalist victory in 1939 possible".

In exchange for profligate material incentives would Franco allow Allied troops to "reinforce" his border with Axis-controlled France? It is unlikely, but not beyond the realm of posibility.

Very, very unlikely. #1. Franco's own political party, the falangists or whatever they were called, would have had a coniption fit. #2. The United Kingdom, housing the Republican Government of Spain in Exile, is going to suddenly do an about face and openly support a "fascist" regime put in place by hitler and mussolini's direct intervention? I know politics is a dirty sport, but that would perhaps be too much even for the UK.

Finally, if there was peace with the Soviet Union in '44, that doesnt mean the Soviets or the Germans would move all their troops from their new border - both would guard it and do so heavily given that both leaders arent the kind that would trust the other's word. How many divisions could actually be moved out? How much construction resources would be diverted to new facilities in the East rather then upgrading the Atlantic wall?

The Germans had a habit of leaving their borders relatively undefended 1939 to 1941. The defensive army in the West during the invasion of poland was minimal, the defensive army in the East during the invasion of france was minimal. Hitler was a gambler, and his mentality is to take increasingly larger risks in the face of worsening odds to return to the status quo.

Looks guys, I'm a big fan of the Allies and all, my relatives literally fighting in some of these battles, but the reality is Normandy becomes a much, much, much tougher nut to crack with the OKW's undivided attention. The idea that the Allies fair better against more numerous, better armed, vetern troops is absurd.

Again, I'm not saying the Allies don't have it in them to win in the long-haul, I'm just saying there is every reason to believe a large scale failure in the West would have had major political ramifications, and that with the Ostfront armies at their disposal, the OKW has the tools to actually win these campaigns.

- WHD

[Tailz]

Do you think Mao just popped up out of nowhere in 1948? And the Soviet Union did invade Manchuria in 1945, yet China did not end up as a Soviet province.

My theory is that Stalin would be fighting in China (against the Japanese) to capture and hold terratory, any gains he makes he plans to hold and install puppet leaders - which I don't see Mao being too favorable towards being a puppet of Stalin. Lets not forget the political wrangling it took to get Stalin to withdrawl from China when he was a part of the Allies - now if Stalin was fighting in China on his own, not as a part of the Allies, it would be Stalins law, Stalins rules.

Invading and occupying Australia would have stretched the Japanese forces too thin; they were having enough trouble in China as it was. And Australia on its own was no threat to the Japanese.

Too thin maybe, but the Japanese had to attack Australia because it was a major base of operations in the Asia-Pacific area. Plus its full of resources the Japanese went to war to gain in the first place.

The German forces on the Eastern Front could only have been turned west following the total defeat of the Soviet Union, as I pointed out. And yes, the Germans did keep a huge deployment of troops on the Eastern Front following Russia's withdrawal from WWI in 1917. They used them to (try to) occupy massive swathes of territory. Little good it did them.

This is one of those "What if" sort of theories. My assumption was based on some form of truce between Russia and Germany. Thus Germany would be able to move the bulk of its forces west. Obviously Germany would not leave its Russian border undefended.

Tell me , how do you keep 150 divisions near the shoreline with air planes bombing you and naval artilery pounding your ass all the time ?

Dispersal of forces so that one strike does not hit a large concentrated force. Plus think of the added defences the bombers and navy would have to deal with it all those resources that were in the east, were directed to the west. Next is the quality of those defensive units on the beaches. A number of the beach defence units the Allies ran into were 2nd rate units. Such as Russian volunteers from POW camps, etc. Now take those out and replace them with professional German soldiers with experience from the French Campaign and many Eastern Front experience. Now take Omaha beach, the American forces were stalled there with the quality of troops they had - now change that to veteran fully German units with combat experience and Bradley may have gone from contemplating cancelling Omaha Beach, to really cancelling it.

[Thunderhawk]

The Germans had a habit of leaving their borders relatively undefended 1939 to 1941. The defensive army in the West during the invasion of poland was minimal, the defensive army in the East during the invasion of france was minimal. Hitler was a gambler, and his mentality is to take increasingly larger risks in the face of worsening odds to return to the status quo.

Your source is dated. The construction of the Atlantic wall and the super AA bunkers in various german cities by '43 (and continued in '44) shows a change in mindset. Furthermore, why would the Nazis move much of their army away from a land border with the Soviets just so they could reposition it where there is a great deal natural and artificual barrier hampering a possible allied landing.

Looks guys, I'm a big fan of the Allies and all, my relatives literally fighting in some of these battles, but the reality is Normandy becomes a much, much, much tougher nut to crack with the OKW's undivided attention. The idea that the Allies fair better against more numerous, better armed, vetern troops is absurd.

No one is saying it would be easier.

[William_H_Dougherty]

Your source is dated. The construction of the Atlantic wall and the super AA bunkers in various german cities by '43 (and continued in '44) shows a change in mindset. Furthermore, why would the Nazis move much of their army away from a land border with the Soviets just so they could reposition it where there is a great deal natural and artificual barrier hampering a possible allied landing.

Because Hitler was an amateur strategist who, from 1939 to 1945, directed his generals into a continuous series of "relentless and almighty" killing blows against the "enemy", starting with the Ardennes Offensive in 1940 and ending with an Ardennes Offensive in December 1944 (although he ordered imagined "fatal blows" just shortly before he blew his brains out).

He would, in my opinion, have re-positioned a considerable amount of troops westwards. In many cases, this wouldn't be on a divisional level, rather the kamfgruppes in the East would probably have been used to re-inforce the undermanned divisions in the west, to get them back up to 1939 levels.

You logic, that a war in the East ends yet no troops and equipment are re-distributed to the West, well, I'm not sure I follow it...

No one is saying it would be easier.

From my perspective, some posters seem to be manufacturing a dream scenario almost as cloud 9ish as the idea of a 1944 peace itself between the SOV and GER (why in the hell would Stalin, having decisively turned the tide in 1943, negotiate a peace when all of Europe could be his prize?).

A Germany fighting a SINGLE front against the Allies (fine, fine, two fronts; one in Italy) is one tough nut to crack. The resources committed to Normandy, historically, are just insufficient to accomplish the goal.

- WHD

[Thunderhawk]

He would, in my opinion, have re-positioned a considerable amount of troops westwards.

You logic, that a war in the East ends yet no troops and equipment are re-distributed to the West, well, I'm not sure I follow it...

That seems to be the point of contention. I acknowledge the scenario of the OP, but that doesn't mean we discard our knowledge of how the people acted. The whole German military machine could be put to defending Italy and France but they always had this option. They didn't do so because they had pressing issues - their retreating Eastern front. The OP changes the pressing issue somewhat, so I believe that some divisions would be sent West, but the iron clad aspect of the ceasefire for the purpose of this debate would not have been known to Hilter and co. As such, he and his staff would still have prepared for (and IMO expected) a Soviet back stab and that is on top of the occupation forces they would have to leave behind. I don't believe a lot of the manpower and equipment would have been sent west as there was still a large and pressing need for it in the East.

West: Natural terrain advantage for defence augmented by the Atlantic wall. Manned. Attack expected.
East: Few natural defences with no fixed fortifications. Needs to be manned. "ceasefire"

You mention their tactics early war, I mention trends and new tactics they had adopted later in the war. Why do you believe Hitler would play by his 1939 rules and not his 1943 rules?

[William_H_Dougherty]

You mention their tactics early war, I mention trends and new tactics they had adopted later in the war. Why do you believe Hitler would play by his 1939 rules and not his 1943 rules?

From my perspective Hitler always played by the same rules, as I said, the very first major offensive in the west was very similiar to the very last (including the territory the offensive was directed through, the Ardennes).

He did let a few Generals, notably Model, Manstein, and Guderian, control the show for a bit (or allow them to talk him out of some of his rather stupid strategic decisions), but Hitler's tendency to gamble on Grand Offensives lasted up until a few hours before he blew his brains out, even though Generals had long since begun ignoring his orders.

- WHD

[Tailz]

From my perspective Hitler always played by the same rules, as I said, the very first major offensive in the west was very similiar to the very last (including the territory the offensive was directed through, the Ardennes).

Hitler did change later in the war, from risk taker willing to gamble to capture territory and resources as compared to later when he was unwilling to give up and inch without a heroic battle to the last man and the last bullet. When it came to operations into enemy territory Hitler was a gambler, he was willing to roll the dice and let Generals like Guderian dash ahead. But when it came to operations on territory the German army had captured - even more so for territory that was considered Germany proper - Hitlers mentality changed from the risk taking gambler to a stubbornly defiant hoarder who was unwilling to relinquish even a scrap of dirt to the enemy. Thus the German army was often forced into futile "last stand" battles in defence of some new festung the Furher had just declared.

Hitler was willing to gamble on making a gain if he had nothing to lose, but didn't even want to hedge his bets with a partial loss for a greater gain. Giving up anything, even if in the ends you ended up in a stronger position, was seen as a failure by giving up anything at all.

[Thunderhawk]

From my perspective Hitler always played by the same rules, as I said, the very first major offensive in the west was very similiar to the very last (including the territory the offensive was directed through, the Ardennes).

Reinforcing the Atlantic wall would not be a major offensive, it would be a reorganization of defences.