[MB.]

You consider 262s in 1940 ridiculous but not 2 carriers in the kriegsmarine at the same time?

[William_H_Dougherty]

You consider 262s in 1940 ridiculous but not 2 carriers in the kriegsmarine at the same time?

What type of carriers is he talking about? A small fleet of lighter carriers converted from passenger liners would have been possible a la the aquila.



Not that it did Italy any good.

- WHD

[cowofzot]

True. Nice to see someone with knowledge & intellect. Seydlitz was a conversion job also. Small fast well armed carriers would've been Germany's best option. Outrun some of the enemy's warships, but still carry enough planes to sink cargo ships. As it was the Bismarck & Tirpitz didn't accomplish that much. The Z plan wasn't all that great.

As to Norway, boths sides lost about an equal amount of warships, 14 I think. Difference being British navy could absorb it better. Germany replaced it's lost destroyers fairly quickly though.



Here are some German surface ship successes.

March 15, 1941-The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sink 16 merchant vessels before being sighted by the British battleship Rodney on March 16. The Rodney queries the ship on its identification, to which the German Gneisenau replies “H.M.S Emerald”. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau then return home to Brest, arriving 6 days later, on March 22.
http://www.angelfire.com/ia/totalwar/km ... horst.html


Scheer
Captain Krancke sailed northwards, passed through the Denmark Strait and eventually reached Kiel on 1 April 1941, having steamed over 46,000 nautical miles (85,000 km) and sinking 16 merchant ships. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_poc ... ral_Scheer


Hipper.
Admiral Hipper sailed on her second Atlantic cruise on 1 February 1941. On 12 February, she intercepted the unescorted convoy SLS-64. Seven ships out of 19 were sunk

Graf Spee got 10 before being cornered in South America.

Atlantis got 22 & the other disguised surface Raiders did well for the most part.

[MB.]

Yah a Nazi carrier fleet would have been about as 'possible' as having 262s in 1940 because it presumes a completely different direction for the Kreigsmarine based on nazi political leadership decisions. And it wouldn't matter anyway having one fleet carrier and one escort carrier would have made no difference at all. But the fact jack is that the Nazis didn't have either of these things because of the naval policy they followed. This is just more idle speculation and counterfactualism. The question of what the best conceivable naval policy for the Nazis to have pursued is however a very legitimate question and I welcome some honest discussion in that regard.


And what happened to all of the Kriegsmarine by 1945? Oh, it seems it was totally destroyed. Were the merchant interceptions at all significant in the course of the war? Was it smart to spread the navy out and have it systematically destroyed?

[cowofzot]

No one mentioned a carrier fleet. & everyone well aware of the fate of the surface fleet in later war years.

Merchant interceptions significant in the war? Yes. Atlantis intercepted a ship containing British merchant codes that enabled the breaking of that code, also the war dispositions of the British in SE Asia which was shared with the Japanese that gave them a serious intelligence advantage when they attacked Malaya.

A U-boat sunk a ship containing all the motors for 8th Army tanks which created a time delay. There can be no doubt of the relevance of cargo ship intercepts as regards the complexion & progression of war. 1 theater can be dramatically altered or lengthened.

The sinking or interception of Rommel's supply ships can leave no doubt on this issue.









SS Automedon
A thorough search of the ship, however, found 15 bags of Top Secret mail for the British Far East Command, including a large quantity of decoding tables, Fleet orders, gunnery instructions, and Naval Intelligence reports. The most significant find was, however, a small green bag discovered in the chart room near the bridge. Marked "Highly Confidential" and equipped with holes to allow it to sink if it had to be thrown overboard, the bag contained an envelope addressed to Robert Brooke Popham, Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command. The envelope contained documents prepared by the British War Cabinet's Planning Division which included their evaluations of the strength and status of British land and naval forces in the Far East, a detailed report on Singapore's defenses, and information on the roles to be played by Australian and New Zealand forces in the Far East in the event that Japan entered the war on the Axis side.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Automedon


Captain Rogge soon realised the importance of the intelligence material he had captured from the Automedon and quickly transferred the documents onto the vessel Ole Jacob, captured earlier, ordering Lieutenant Commander Paul Kamenz and six of his crew to take charge of the vessel and convey the captured material to the German representatives in Japan

[MB.]

Don't conflate uboat sinkings with surface ship operations.

Atlantis intercepted a ship containing British merchant codes that enabled the breaking of that code

What were the implications of this event? Was it worth building hundreds of thousands of tons of warships at prohibitive cost?

The envelope contained documents prepared by the British War Cabinet's Planning Division which included their evaluations of the strength and status of British land and naval forces in the Far East, a detailed report on Singapore's defenses, and information on the roles to be played by Australian and New Zealand forces in the Far East in the event that Japan entered the war on the Axis side.

Sounds like another Lost Letter / Enigma machine decryption analogy.


Allow me to quote Eric Raeder on the subject of the War, Sept 3 1939:

Today the war against England and France, which the Fuhrer had previously assured us we would not have to confront until 1944 and which he believed he could avoid up until the very last minute... As far as the Kriegsmarine is concerned, it is obvious that it is not even remotely ready for the titanic struggle against England. To be sure, the brief period of time that has elapsed since the Agreement of 1935 has witnessed the creation of a well-trained and well-conceived force of U-boats, of which approximately twenty-six are currently ready for Atlantic operations, but these boats are still far too few to exert a decisive influence upon the war

From, Charles Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era

[cowofzot]

Atlantis intercepted a ship containing British merchant codes that enabled the breaking of that code

What were the implications of this event? Was it worth building hundreds of thousands of tons of warships at prohibitive cost?



The implications of this event are descibed above, in addition to that information, the German U-boats gained invaluable data for attacking allied cargo ships, the whereabout therof, routes etc. Have no idea what your building tons of warships as a result question means. What are you referring to? extra allied escort duty ships?

As to Raeder, yes it was not planned to go to war with England til much later, again well known comments. The Germans did rather well against the RN in early yrs, 3 to 1 ratio in their favor depite overwheliming odds.

[MB.]

The ratio you speak of, does that refer to tonnage of warships sunk? Are uboats and submarine losses included? What percentage of German forces was lost during the war? What percentage of allied?

[cowofzot]

Actually it's beer tonnage, taken down per capita.


On 31 Dec 1942 the 'Admiral Hipper' first met the Convoy in poor visibility and the 'Battle of the Barents Sea' commenced. The Kreuzer damaged the Destroyers 'Onslow' and 'Obedient' and sank 'Achates'.

http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=12317

[Smilin' Dave]

After airbases established, Iceland would be no different than Norway where ships protected by Luftwaffe.

Aside from being more isolated, harder to resupply (you can't catch a train there...) and thus more vulnerable to any counter-stroke... all while drawing German assets off.

France more modernized as regards machine tools etc than Hungary, easier to produce there than Hungary. yes, workers available as evidenced by the ME 210 being built there.

Labour wasn't always as tractable in France as it was Hungary... you know, since it was occupied territory or under the Vichy government . Your ME 210 example is like a drop in the bucket compared to your mass truck production concept. I see you've already given up on the earlier idea of Poland as an industrial colony. I've also yet to hear how you intend to re-tool foreign factories to churn out German designs to German specifications. Comparing France and Hungary is all well and good, but the comparison needs to be with Germany.

And, like all of your other ideas, you haven't put forward any explanation as to how this would come about. Without even the pretense to explain how these war winning changes could come about, there isn't any real value to this discussion. It's just a wishlist, where even the vaguest plans could have worked if only "something". Or any minor exception can be blown up into a continental scale policy. Scenarios where any impediment can be waved away.

Okay, Germany wins because of some improbable (material and/or organisational) change. What now? Is that the point of the post, Germany wins by virtue of magic wand? How boring.

Strategically they did quite well at Desert warfare, British weren't able to win any decisive battles against em for 18 months.

Rommel had no strategic accomplishments in the desert other than stopping the Italian collapse in 1940, and notionally tying up the British. Given they had few other theatres to fight in, I wouldn't count that frankly. On the other hand he captured nothing of value, and often had to withdraw and abandon what little he did capture. Not a single victory of Rommel's was decisive, because the strategic context was that without massive defeat, even annihilation (or the loss of all their resupply points), the British could always replenish. Rommel's force however was whittled away, something he couldn't afford in the strategic context. Much of this was because of poor logistics, which as well as being a material issue, were also a result of bad organisation... which is something that comes under strategy.

Allied tactics in the desert were generally poor, but their strategy played against Rommel's weaknesses and their strengths.

[cowofzot]

No haven't given up on Poland.

Iceland would have supply issues, true. Mainly fuel & ammo.


Rommel had many strategic accomplishments in the desert, starting with bufooning the British 500 miles backwards using ruses to make them think he was a bigger force than he was. Outflanking was another of his strategic accomplishments. But that's another thread.

Rommel staged an impressive military parade through the street of Tripoli. He arranged for each tank secretly to circle back and rejoin the parade, thus bolstering the numbers on display for the benefit of enemy spies.



His 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion's tanks and armored cars charged along a 1000-yard front straight toward the town, while vehicles in the rear were instructed to raise dust. Many of the vehicles in the assault were fakes, members of the so-called "cardboard division," but in the clouds of dust raised, they appeared to give the Germans a considerable force. The British, seeing what they believed to be an impressive enemy contingent, withdrew to Mersa Brega. The "cardboard division" was perhaps Rommel's most ingenious deceptive technique. With a few Fiat and Volkswagen chassis, covered with pasteboard "armor" and gun barrels cut from telegraph poles, Rommel had duped the British into retreating without a fight.


http://www.wzaponline.com/RommelsLeadership.pdf






Quote;
Okay, Germany wins because of some improbable (material and/or organisational) change. What now? Is that the point of the post, Germany wins by virtue of magic wand? How boring.


OK, Nope, nobody said any such thing, certainly not I. Re-read thread title.

[William_H_Dougherty]

Rommel had no strategic accomplishments in the desert other than stopping the Italian collapse in 1940, and notionally tying up the British. Given they had few other theatres to fight in, I wouldn't count that frankly.

There be logic to that statement. The African Campaign only got significant coverage in the West because that was the only theatre in Europe where the Allies were still fighting the Axis on land. The only reason it gained signficant coverage in Germany was because Operation Barbarossa faltering and the Ministry of Propaganda decided to blow Rommel's victories out of proportion to boost up morale.

The "strategic" benefit to the African Campaign was tying down the Allies and keeping Italy in the Alliance. In other words, it's importance was in allowing most of the German Armed Forces to concentrate on a single opponent in the East.

On the other hand he captured nothing of value, and often had to withdraw and abandon what little he did capture. Not a single victory of Rommel's was decisive, because the strategic context was that without massive defeat, even annihilation (or the loss of all their resupply points), the British could always replenish.

Which was nearly impossible given the Brits controlled nearly all of Eastern Africa and the Middle East.

Rommel's force however was whittled away, something he couldn't afford in the strategic context. Much of this was because of poor logistics, which as well as being a material issue, were also a result of bad organisation... which is something that comes under strategy.

I don't think Rommel was a bad general, I just don't think he was that great (compared to some other German Generals). As far as Germany's Field Marshal's go, over their career's the accomplishments of Kesselring, von Rundstedt, Manstein, and Model were objectively superior to those of Rommel.

Allied tactics in the desert were generally poor, but their strategy played against Rommel's weaknesses and their strengths.

Well, I'm not sure this is an issue of better tactics or strategy. The Allies didn't win battles against the Germany on equal terms, they relied on overwhelming man, material, and air superiority to turn the tide of battles. I suppose that is part of a "Grand Strategy" which no doubt was effective, but that was the choice of the civilian administrations rather than military commanders.

Rommel had many strategic accomplishments in the desert, starting with bufooning the British 500 miles backwards using ruses to make them think he was a bigger force than he was. Outflanking was another of his strategic accomplishments. But that's another thread.

I'm not sure that is a "strategic" accomplishment. Those are just ballsy tactics. Seriously, you guys are forgetting what I consider to his biggest innovation.

Has something to do with 88s.

Other than that, he was an imaginative general, but I'm not sure he's of the same calibre as the other Field Marshal's I mentioned.

- WHD

[cowofzot]

Ballsy tactics & strategy are one & the same thing.

tac·tics
(used with a sing. verb) The military science that deals with securing objectives set by strategy, especially the technique of deploying and directing troops, ships, and aircraft in effective maneuvers against an enemy: Tactics is a required course at all military academies.




Here Galland, Milch & Goering discuss mass producing the Italian G-55 fighter in Germany. Another example albeit in reverse of building new machines which require jigs, training of workers etc. Yet it WAS very seriously considered.


Goering: If the Italian aircraft is good, then we won't deny the fact, and we'll mass produce them here. We don't want any false pride.

Milch: Thereby we could advance a year.

Galland: And it would also do our designers good.







AWM 54 423/4/103 Part 63, Report of a Conference held by Reichsmarschall Goering on 22 February 1943.

Milch: ... Perhaps Petersen can inform us on this question and also about the comparison flights in Italy.

Petersen: ... There will be a further report about comparison flights with all the Italian types ... Against this, the Italian fighter is equal to the German fighter, especially as regards rate of climb. They are also superior in armament. The Fiat 55 aircraft has four cannon and a performance similar to that of the German aircraft, although powered by an engine that
is a hundred horsepower less.

Peltz: Were they series or experimental aircraft?

Petersen: There is an experimental series of ten aircraft, but these trials concerned new aircraft that had been 'titivated up'.

Goering: I'm glad that the Italians at long last have produced a respectable fighter. And I can only say; let them build them to capacity.

Milch: We also should do something in that sphere. It is indeed a disgrace to our own industry.

Goering: The Italians have never built inferior aircraft and have always been competent in the construction of aircraft and engines. I remember the Fiat and Alfa. They have also held the world speed record. The ability of the Italian aircraft industry has always been of the best. They are unable to mass produce however, and there we must help them. We can consider ourselves lucky, if they have produced a good fighter aircraft. It's one in the eye for our own people anyway.

Petersen: We must attend to this at once. The airframe of the Fiat G 55 can accommodate the DB 603 engine, while the Me 109 is unable to do so any longer. The G 55 with the DB 603 would be an ideal fighter aircraft.

Galland: From our experience the Italians have always forgotten something in their fighter aircraft, either the armour or guns.

Goering: It's to be hoped however that for the purposes of these comparison flights, they've been informed about this, otherwise it's a waste of time.

Petersen: The fighter specialist has flown the aircraft. With the exception of the radio it carried complete equipment, and fuel for one and a half hours, whereas we carried fuel for only one hour. We can't ignore the fact that the Italian aircraft has a performance equal to that of our latest types.

Milch: Then please obtain three Italian aircraft at once, and fly them here, in Rechlin. I would have the DB 603 installed in these aircraft that we have been discussing this morning. It would mean a considerable advance towards the Me 209. I can't imagine the FW 190 with the BMW 801 engine as it is today being sufficient for the next two and half years [in the event it had to be!!! - AA] Especially as we don't know what the English and the Americans are building.

...

Goering: I'm also in favour of the proposal. However I consider it more than likely that the English will effect an improvement with their own types. I would like to ask what is our best means of improving our fighters other than the jet propulsion business?
Milch: The Me 209 and especially its engine. ...

...

Goering: If the Italian aircraft is good, then we won't deny the fact, and we'll mass produce them here. We don't want any false pride.

Milch: Thereby we could advance a year.

Galland: And it would also do our designers good.

Goering: On top of that perhaps we could include the Italian pilots as well, in our complete programme. Anyway I'm very pleased to hear this about the Italians.

[Decky]

The British (or maybe Americans)

Please let this be trolling, the American did not capture the enigma machine, just becuase there is an American film that tells the story with Americans instead of Brits dosn't make it true.

[cowofzot]

Looks like ammo was the main thing produced in Poland during the war.


After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 HASAG became the main supplier of ammunition to the Generalgouvernement. Figures show that on the 1 February 1942, HASAG was the largest employer among the sixty-four Wehrmachtsbetriebe in the Generalgouvernment, with a workforce of 13, 850 mostly Poles. Of these 10,267 worked at the Skarzysko – Kamienna factories, 1,379 at Granat and 2,204 at the Czestochowa foundry.


http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org ... hasag.html






COP The Central Industrial Region (Polish: Centralny Okręg Przemysłowy, abbreviated COP),

During the German occupation, most of the factories were converted to contribute to the German war effort.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Industrial_Region

[Smilin' Dave]

So what you're telling me is that Nazi Germany could have won WWII by manufacturing less ammunition? I suppose since your extra trucks will be using up the equally rare resource of fuel, this might be a cunning way to bring the Nazi war machine to a halt. Hang on, I just remembered the point of this discussion

Ballsy tactics & strategy are one & the same thing.

No, it is a question of scale, both of the elements involved and of the effects of actions. Go look up the definitions of tactics and strategy, and for extra credit read up on operational warfare. Then come back and tell me if you still really believe that 'flank those guys on the hill, even though it's dangerous' really fits the description of strategy.

[cowofzot]

So what you're telling me is that Nazi Germany could have won WWII by manufacturing less ammunition?

Nope, 2nd time I've addressed that innuendo of yours that as yet has not been posted or inferred by myself in any way shape or form.

Flank on the hill again, not anything posted by myself as yet. Already posted said definition, ( 3 posts above).

Here it is again.

tac·tics
(used with a sing. verb) The military science that deals with securing objectives set by strategy, especially the technique of deploying and directing troops, ships, and aircraft in effective maneuvers against an enemy: Tactics is a required course at all military academies.

[MB.]

Notice how tactics differs from strategy, and how both differ from operational warfare?

[cowofzot]

Very observant. Yes we know. Both are "part of" Operational warfare however.

[MB.]

'We' know? That just raises further questions!