[foxdemon]

(1) the US subs almost totally ineffective early in the war due to torpedo problems?

(2) the Japs had a large stockpile of oil got the figures somewhere (yes I must organize my data).

The US subs seemed to do alright against Japanese merchant men. Remember that in those days subs still had a deck gun and often fought while surfaced.

The Japanese did have an oil stockpile, but only 6 months worth. When America put the oil embargo on them, in an attempt to force Japan to withdraw from China, the Japanese were left with a choice between capitulate to US demands or attack. Being Japanese, they choose the honorable solution.

I'm not sure that US submarine operations are an adequete explanation either. One would assume the Japanese would the opportunity to stockpile (or otherwise have available) supplies prior to launching its offensive across the Pacific, before the submarines could have started to have an effect on the flow of materials. Despite this opportunity Japanese forces even in the earliest days of their operations seemed to be short of supplies. Which might suggest there wasn't much to stockpile in the first place.

No doubt the operations in China would have been using up their resources as fast as they could get them. It is worth considering though, that even when Japan occupied all of SE Asia, there still wasn't enough to go round. The American subs prevented any effective shipping to Japan, but many people starved in Asia when the Japanese controlled the place. Maybe the military government was hopeless at economics?

Another odd thing is technology. Japan ended the war with pretty much the same sort of technology it started out with. Germany, alone amongst the axis powers, developed very advanced technolgy, as did the Americans and British. The Russians developed their technolgy as much as they could too. Why didn't Japan develop?

Note, Italy didn't either. It might be something to do with a shallow industrial base. Yet Japan managed to have state of the art gear at the out break of WWII. Seems odd to me....

[pugsville]

found some data on Japanese shipping and sinking, (US briefing docs)

in the first 10 months the Allies sunk by all methods 600,000 tons of Japanese shipping, total afloat at start of war 5.4 mil tons, 10 months they had 5.5 mil tons (built / requisitioned enough to cover the loses etc ) in the next 2 months 330,000 tons were sunk, in the first year of the war the allies hand not significantly reduced the tonnage (first 13 months end 42 - 5.25 mil tons afloat, end of 43 - 4.17 mil tons, end of 44 -1.97 mil tons. ) so first year 4.5 % second year 20% third year 50%. Total tonnage sunk by subs dec 41-feb 43 717,000 tons. So subs were sinking the vast bulk early war and 300,000 was in two months at the end of 42.

figures from the US strategic bombing survey - the war against Japanese transportation published may 1947.
(available from the combined arms research library very useful site)
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/


Blarg. Summary early sub warfare was not reducing significantly Japanese tonnage afloat.

got some thing with the oil storage just cant find it.

[foxdemon]

Here's a link to an intereseting blog on the subject. The author provides some useful links:

http://karbuz.blogspot.com/2006/10/oil- ... wii-2.html


The Japanese didn't use their subs aggressively against American merchantmen, according to this blog. They did use they subs to sink everything afloat along the Australia coast, which is odd as the Australian coastal ships weren't making a huge contribution to the allied war effort.


The figures on tonnage sunk by the US in the pacific is interesting. The accounts I had read claimed the handful of subs Nimitz had avalible were disproptionally effective and that this success was attributed to the Japanese not employing conveying. Give the US subs had defective torpedos and that there were only 16 of them, I guess sinking 600,000 tons in 10 months is not a bad effort. Remember merchantmen in those days were 10,000 to 15,000 tons. So 600,000 is a lot of individual ships.


[edit] here's an interesting site about US subs in the Pacific during WWII:

http://www.valoratsea.com/calendar.htm

[pugsville]

Gestimation math...

10,000 a ship. 600,000 tons. say 60 ships. No average 6 ships a month. At anytime say 1/3 subs on station (there getting to station with refit etc). Roughly 6subs effectively on patrol at any given moment, that is 1 ship sunk per patrol month per sub on station.

Does not seem overly effective on that math.

Looking at data Ships look to average much less then 10,000 tons.


looking at first 13 months of war

submarines

dec 1941 6 sunk 31,693 tons
jan 1942 7 sunk 28,351 tons
feb 1942 5 sunk 15,975 tons
mar 1942 7 sunk 26,183 tons
apr 1942 5 sunk 26,886 tons
may 1942 20 sunk 86,110
jun 1942 6 sunk 20,021 tons
jul 1942 8 sunk 39,356 tons
aug 1942 17.5 sunk 76,352 tons
sep 1942 11 sunk 39,389 tons
oct 1942 25 sunk 115,920 tons
nov 1942 8 sunk 35,358
dec 1942 14 sunk 48,271

submarines 119.5 sunk 569,665 (average tonnage 4700 tons a ship)
average 9.2 ships 43,820 tons a month

other sinking this total period
army air .................. 22 ships sunk 94013 tons
navy land based air 16 ships sunk 113010 tons
carrier air .................3 ships sunk 21,610 tons
mines .......................5 ships sunk 26,712 tons
surface ships gunfire 10.5 ships sunk 58,461 tons
other (accident etc) 18 ships sunk 73815 tons.

total 13 months submarines 119.5 sunk 569,665
total 13 months other methods 74.5 ships 387,621 tons


original guestimation based on germans u-boats spent 1/3 time on active station. In the pacific I think longer travel time.
so maybe 25% so change to 4 subs on station. avarage 9 ships, 2 per month during active patrol?

[Azale]

I played some Hearts of Iron with Japan today and easily took over most of Asia. Why wasn't this the case in real life? I only have superficial knowledge about the topic. The navy was more predominant in Japan and the Japanese were more interested in expanding in the Pacific and so on. Was that all though? I therefore I have two questions: Why did Germany and Japan fail to coordinate their war effort? Second, to what extent did Japan affect Soviet strategy in WWII?

Thanks.

I'm going to answer these questions without taking into account anything posted previously!

1. Germany and Japan were not exactly solid allies. It wasn't until fairly late INTO the Sino-Japanese conflict that Germany actually withdrew material and training aid from the Republic of China. The idea of a two front assault against the Soviets was really most of the basis of the Japanese-German alliance, and the Japanese became pretty distrustful of the Germans after the Soviet-German nonaggression pact.

Once the war started in Russia, the Japanese already had a separate accord with Moscow. The Kwantung Army in Manchuria had already proven itself inferior to Soviet forces in the area, and could not risk conflict in the north when they were having to pour the bulk of their forces into battles in mainland China, Southeast Asia, and eventually the Pacific.

2. The Soviets were extremely wary of a two front war. This is why the pursued non aggression pacts with their mortal enemies, the Nazis, and the hyper nationalist Japanese who made no secret their wish for Siberia as fertile Japanese land for colonization.

While they were nominally neutral v. Japan for most of the war, they pushed Mao into accepting a temporary United Front with Jiang Jieshi because they saw the latter as the real leader of Chinese resistance against Japan. Fighting against the Japanese via their Chinese proxies was Stalin's strategy. Several times Mao attempted to break away from the United Front strategy, before and after the Xi'an Incident, but Stalin insisted China remain at least kinda united against the Japanese.

[Lagalag967]

One factor that was detrimental to the Japanese cause during 2nd World War was its own ethnocentric foreign policy. It could have been better if it pursued a Pan-Asian than an ethnocentric nationalist foreign policy and built up links with Asian nationalist organisations. Japan's imitation of the Western empires of that time in their ethnic-centredness, preferring to build up its own Western-style empire than forge links with groups that could've led to later political and economic benefits for Japan was one significant factor in Japan's failure in the Second World War.

Of course, given the vogue of Western empires at that time and our benefit of hindsight which they of course didn't have, Japan was left probably with no other choice.

[Azale]

One factor that was detrimental to the Japanese cause during 2nd World War was its own ethnocentric foreign policy. It could have been better if it pursued a Pan-Asian than an ethnocentric nationalist foreign policy and built up links with Asian nationalist organisations. Japan's imitation of the Western empires of that time in their ethnic-centredness, preferring to build up its own Western-style empire than forge links with groups that could've led to later political and economic benefits for Japan was one significant factor in Japan's failure in the Second World War.

Of course, given the vogue of Western empires at that time and our benefit of hindsight which they of course didn't have, Japan was left probably with no other choice.

The only reason Japan (more precisely hypernationalist elements in the IJA and IJN) went on this path of national harikiri is BECAUSE of their rabid ethnocentrism and delusions of grandeur. If Japan doesn't have these extreme elements controlling their foreign policy, they don't invade China or SEA or the Pacific etc, and so have no need to coordinate with Asian nationalist organizations etc.

[Lagalag967]

Well, they don't need to invade the neighboring geography to have a connection to Asian independentist organisations and gain influence and/or dominance in the eastern Asian region. If it were possible, and with some witty cunning from the Japanese, while defending their national borders from foreign (i.e. Western) power and influence, they could have given various and necessary aid to the nationalist groups in Southeast Asia and even China (they really lost it with Dr Sun, if I'm not mistaken), giving them future capital with which to expand their influence in the region. A Pan-Asian foreign policy than an ethnocentric one, a policy that takes advantage of anti-Western sentiment in those places, would be of great benefit to Japan.

[Smilin' Dave]

Aside from the political imperatives noted by Azale that drove Japanese expansionism, don't forget the material drives. A desire to secure access to raw materials and even space (this was the era where the Japanese government sponsored initiatives to send settlers to land in far off places like South America in order to relieve population pressures) were also pretty important. Neither of these can be easily gained by encouraging independence movements. An independent government might have been able to trade its own resources, but they might have just as easily traded those to their former masters (who have ready made markets and existing connections/infrastructure) rather than their new fellow 'Pan Asians'.

[Lagalag967]

Aside from the political imperatives noted by Azale that drove Japanese expansionism, don't forget the material drives. A desire to secure access to raw materials and even space (this was the era where the Japanese government sponsored initiatives to send settlers to land in far off places like South America in order to relieve population pressures) were also pretty important. Neither of these can be easily gained by encouraging independence movements. An independent government might have been able to trade its own resources, but they might have just as easily traded those to their former masters (who have ready made markets and existing connections/infrastructure) rather than their new fellow 'Pan Asians'.

Although I may agree with you on the material and population transfer parts, I'm not sure with the latter you mentioned. The problem with it is that it highlights the "material" over the "political", in the sense that continuous trading with the former colonial master would have rendered that whole independence campaign for nothing. Japan was pretty much the beacon of freedom for Asian nationalists from the late 19th cen to the early 20th.

[Smilin' Dave]

Trade is rarely about 'beacons of freedom' if the decolonisation of the 1950s was any guide.

[Potemkin]

The problem with it is that it highlights the "material" over the "political"

In the end, the material always trumps the political.

in the sense that continuous trading with the former colonial master would have rendered that whole independence campaign for nothing.

How so? They would be trading as (theoretically) equal partners.