[Political Interest]

I have often wondered why the United States gave its support to China instead of Japan. Was there an economic reason or was it mostly out of humanitarian concerns? Did the United States not want Japan to challenge their influence in the Pacific?

[Ombrageux]

I think reason 3 is the most important. It was standard balance of power: Japan could not be allowed to be a hegemonic power in Asia just as Germany (twice, later the USSR) could not be allowed to dominate Europe.

[Rei Murasame]

Ombrageux has pretty much said what I was going to say. I'd also add that reason number three is the same as reason number one, the hegemony issue is intrinsically economic. The Anglo-American power prefers to see Europe and Asia divided within themselves, and so will try to contribute to upsetting any attempts to create adversarial continental powers there, be they creations by force or mutual consent.

Reason number two was probably never a serious factor in anyone's thinking at all.

[Smilin' Dave]

The US had a stronger foothold in China than Japan. Japan had traditionally been an ally of Britain rather than the US, so it stood to reason that China was a more viable future ally.

[Political Interest]

Thank you all for your answers.

I think reason 3 is the most important. It was standard balance of power: Japan could not be allowed to be a hegemonic power in Asia just as Germany (twice, later the USSR) could not be allowed to dominate Europe.

I see. So they did not want to leave the Asia-Pacific region to Japan but instead wanted to have the influence for themselves? Could they equally have said that they would influence the region via Japan instead of China?

Ombrageux has pretty much said what I was going to say. I'd also add that reason number three is the same as reason number one, the hegemony issue is intrinsically economic. The Anglo-American power prefers to see Europe and Asia divided within themselves, and so will try to contribute to upsetting any attempts to create adversarial continental powers there, be they creations by force or mutual consent.

Reason number two was probably never a serious factor in anyone's thinking at all.

That is very true. It is the essence of Atlanticism versus Eurasianism. However would it have meant economic disaster for the US and Britain to support Japan or could they have still profited from a Japanese victory?

The US had a stronger foothold in China than Japan. Japan had traditionally been an ally of Britain rather than the US, so it stood to reason that China was a more viable future ally.

I see but it seems the UK was also weary of Japanese moves. What I do not understand is why the UK did not seek to cooperate with Japanese imperialism and from this divert them away from targeting British colonies in South East Asia. For example they could have recognised Manchukuo and then more or less accepted China as a Japanese sphere of influence in exchange for retaining their control in South and South East Asia. It is possible they could have even offered Japan assistance.

[Rei Murasame]

What I do not understand is why the UK did not seek to cooperate with Japanese imperialism and from this divert them away from targeting British colonies in South East Asia.

The haute-bourgeoisie was ascendant in the UK, and was a big global financial power at that time. To their eyes, collaborating with fascism (a petty-bourgeoisie movement intending to restrict their operations) would be like having a patient go to a dentist to have teeth drilled and filled despite having no material incentive to do so.

British society did not have a viable fascist movement inside it at the time, and so that left the ruling class of the UK with the latitude to actually explore their options: with Japan and against America, or with America and against Japan?

For their class, going against Axis must have appeared to be the most profitable choice. And it really was, wasn't it?

To understand what I mean, I will paint a funny example. Imagine if Mercosul assembled a massive force and attacked the USA, and imagine that the UK was still in the present political climate that it is now presently in. Do you think that David Cameron and his advisers and lobbyists would be coming out and pushing to have the UK declare war against the USA in support of Mercosul? Not a chance.

[Far-Right Sage]

China at the time had not been a nation with any tangible hard power and significance for quite some time, had been locked in a civil conflict since long before the rise of even Mao's forces or the Kuomintang and essentially unstable since the disintegration of the Qing dynasty, and posed no viable threat as a hegemon in Asia and the Pacific region in the sense that Japan did. Before the Japanese invasion, it was always anticipated that the authoritarian government under Chiang Kai-Shek would eventually crush the communists as the state held a clear material superiority, and thus, my belief was always that the general consensus was that if China ever managed to screw its head on right and become a continental and even a world power in the sense it is becoming today, it would be on Washington and London's terms with a pliant regime in Beijing in the form of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek's successors. Obviously the outcome of the Chinese Civil War changed all that

Japan was no one's puppet and required no outside assistance through which it could become dependent in order to maintain internal control over its own territory. It has been standard practice throughout history for nations to support the weaker power as a means of chipping away at the strong, as royalist France supported the American rebels of the 18th century, or as the powers of the North Atlantic threw their support behind plucky Kuwait in the 90's.

[Ombrageux]

PI - The Americans did not want to give Asia to China, which was not a power at this point but still overcoming its internal convulsions, nor did they want to dominate Asia themselves (in the sense that the U.S. did not have the means to do so). Rather the U.S., like Britain in Europe, wanted to maintain the division of Asia and did so as an offshore balancer (in the IR jargon). Were China to militarily assert its domination of East Asia, there is no doubt that the U.S. would directly and indirectly oppose this and organize a countervailing coalition (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India..). In fact the Korean and Indochina Wars can be understood as attempts - perhaps misguided in the latter case - to limit the rise of Communist China's influence.

[Smilin' Dave]

What I do not understand is why the UK did not seek to cooperate with Japanese imperialism and from this divert them away from targeting British colonies in South East Asia. For example they could have recognised Manchukuo and then more or less accepted China as a Japanese sphere of influence in exchange for retaining their control in South and South East Asia. It is possible they could have even offered Japan assistance.

You're forgetting that the UK had it's own interests in China, and saw expansionism by Japan as a long term threat to their own colonies. About the only way Britain would have accepted Japanese conquests would have been if it had been somewhere the British didn't not already have interests of their own (...which in that period leaves the moon) and if they had done so without a navy. Given the politicised nature of the Japanese military and its different services, limiting the navy might not have been acceptable. And also leads to a point, which is that the Kwantung Army was essentially making up its own policy at the time - any accord reached between Britain and Japan might have been wrecked by the Kwantung Army or similar.

For their class, going against Axis must have appeared to be the most profitable choice. And it really was, wasn't it?

It was the most profitable choice objectively. What could Japan really offer the UK? It wasn't strong enough on its own to be a useful counter-weight to the United States. And annoying the US means annoying a bigger market and more useful ally. Alliance with Japan was also a sticking point for Commonwealth nations like Australia and Canada, and annoying your own empire isn't really a good idea or particularly useful. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was all about containing Russia, and that ceased to be useful in the lead up to WWI as The Great Game was toned down. Soviet interests in the interwar period tended to be more in the direction of Central Asia rather than Manchuria, making Japan less useful in any possible new framework.

The more you elaborate on your alternative narrative of 'global finance vs. the axis', the less logical it appears.

Japan was no one's puppet and required no outside assistance through which it could become dependent in order to maintain internal control over its own territory.

On the latter part it depends on what period we're talking about. Japan's military adventurism in China etc. had considerably stretched their resources and they clearly were dependent on imports from Western powers to sustain their occupation and ongoing conflict, hence why sanctions bit so hard. Certainly Japan wasn't likely to be a puppet, but it wasn't a strong and independent power either.

[Rei Murasame]

The more you elaborate on your alternative narrative of 'global finance vs. the axis', the less logical it appears.

What? But you just wrote this:

It was the most profitable choice objectively. What could Japan really offer the UK? It wasn't strong enough on its own to be a useful counter-weight to the United States. And annoying the US means annoying a bigger market and more useful ally. Alliance with Japan was also a sticking point for Commonwealth nations like Australia and Canada, and annoying your own empire isn't really a good idea or particularly useful. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was all about containing Russia, and that ceased to be useful in the lead up to WWI as The Great Game was toned down. Soviet interests in the interwar period tended to be more in the direction of Central Asia rather than Manchuria, making Japan less useful in any possible new framework.

I in fact agree with everything you just wrote. That is the interests of finance.

[Political Interest]

The haute-bourgeoisie was ascendant in the UK, and was a big global financial power at that time. To their eyes, collaborating with fascism (a petty-bourgeoisie movement intending to restrict their operations) would be like having a patient go to a dentist to have teeth drilled and filled despite having no material incentive to do so.

British society did not have a viable fascist movement inside it at the time, and so that left the ruling class of the UK with the latitude to actually explore their options: with Japan and against America, or with America and against Japan?

For their class, going against Axis must have appeared to be the most profitable choice. And it really was, wasn't it?

To understand what I mean, I will paint a funny example. Imagine if Mercosul assembled a massive force and attacked the USA, and imagine that the UK was still in the present political climate that it is now presently in. Do you think that David Cameron and his advisers and lobbyists would be coming out and pushing to have the UK declare war against the USA in support of Mercosul? Not a chance.

I see, so basically they could realise their fullest interest by opposing Germany and Japan? However to me I do not see how there was necessarily a contradiction in the Japanese case. Japan was strongly anti-communist, they sought to eliminate Soviet influence in Asia. Again I do not see why they could not have conceded China as a Japanese sphere of influence and supported them in that fully in exchange for Japan choosing not to interfere in Anglo-French-American interests.

Were England, France and America so tied to China that they had no choice but to stay alongside it?

China at the time had not been a nation with any tangible hard power and significance for quite some time, had been locked in a civil conflict since long before the rise of even Mao's forces or the Kuomintang and essentially unstable since the disintegration of the Qing dynasty, and posed no viable threat as a hegemon in Asia and the Pacific region in the sense that Japan did. Before the Japanese invasion, it was always anticipated that the authoritarian government under Chiang Kai-Shek would eventually crush the communists as the state held a clear material superiority, and thus, my belief was always that the general consensus was that if China ever managed to screw its head on right and become a continental and even a world power in the sense it is becoming today, it would be on Washington and London's terms with a pliant regime in Beijing in the form of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek's successors. Obviously the outcome of the Chinese Civil War changed all that

Perhaps it is so. However Chiang was by no means willing to be controlled by the West. In actual fact he was known to be quite anti-American and did not trust the US. Remember that he also wanted to be on the side of Germany and it was only after Germany sided with Japan that the KMT regime and Berlin split. Given his private anti-American feelings and his sympathies for Germany there is nothing to suggest that had the KMT united China that they would have simply been a party to the orders of London, Washington and Paris.

Japan was no one's puppet and required no outside assistance through which it could become dependent in order to maintain internal control over its own territory. It has been standard practice throughout history for nations to support the weaker power as a means of chipping away at the strong, as royalist France supported the American rebels of the 18th century, or as the powers of the North Atlantic threw their support behind plucky Kuwait in the 90's.

I see, so the West did not want a strong Asian power to challenge their influence in the region and so they supported what they perceived to be the weaker party (China) to counter Japan? In essence it means the West opposed Japan simply because they did not want it to be the stronger player in Asia, most notably in place of themselves.

PI - The Americans did not want to give Asia to China, which was not a power at this point but still overcoming its internal convulsions, nor did they want to dominate Asia themselves (in the sense that the U.S. did not have the means to do so). Rather the U.S., like Britain in Europe, wanted to maintain the division of Asia and did so as an offshore balancer (in the IR jargon). Were China to militarily assert its domination of East Asia, there is no doubt that the U.S. would directly and indirectly oppose this and organize a countervailing coalition (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India..). In fact the Korean and Indochina Wars can be understood as attempts - perhaps misguided in the latter case - to limit the rise of Communist China's influence.

I see, therefore they just wanted Asia to remain divided? Why did they want this? So that it would not be a problem for them later?

You're forgetting that the UK had it's own interests in China, and saw expansionism by Japan as a long term threat to their own colonies. About the only way Britain would have accepted Japanese conquests would have been if it had been somewhere the British didn't not already have interests of their own (...which in that period leaves the moon) and if they had done so without a navy. Given the politicised nature of the Japanese military and its different services, limiting the navy might not have been acceptable. And also leads to a point, which is that the Kwantung Army was essentially making up its own policy at the time - any accord reached between Britain and Japan might have been wrecked by the Kwantung Army or similar.

Well I suppose this explains it. They did not like to see Japanese expansionism and perceived it as a threat.

But let us ask this question. Imagine that in the 1900s Sun Yat Sen is successful and is able to build a unified and formidable China by the 1930s which is opposed to European colonialism in the region. Now imagine such a China could actually pose a real threat, you can be certain the West would have had a different attitude to Japan in this instance. It seems like such a scenario is reflective of today.

[fuser]

PI,the more interesting question will be why "Germany" discontinued her support to China in favor of making alliance with Japan. Why she didn't even tried to reconcile theses two rather than abruptly stopping the long standing commitment to China.

[Smilin' Dave]

What? But you just wrote this:

If you read past the bits you've put in bold you'll see most of it boils down to political and strategic considerations. Even the economic factors you've highlighted fit into strategic considerations more than your "global finance" narrative. And why did you bold the bit about The Great Game as though it proved your point? The Great Game actually highlights that Britain wasn't always 'fighting' over economic considerations - Afghanistan wasn't exactly going to be mega bucks for the British or the Russians for example.

I in fact agree with everything you just wrote.

Not really, no. Perhaps you've missed the subtlety so I'll be a bit blunter - Britain didn't ally with Japan because it was a crappy deal for them in every way imaginable, not because of the dictates of your half baked theory.

[Rei Murasame]

Even the economic factors you've highlighted fit into strategic considerations more than your "global finance" narrative.

But strategic considerations which serve the purpose of what?

Perhaps you've missed the subtlety so I'll be a bit blunter - Britain didn't ally with Japan because it was a crappy deal for them in every way imaginable, not because of the dictates of your half baked theory.

I'm not sure why you think it's half-baked. What is the country in-hoc to?

[Smilin' Dave]

But strategic considerations which serve the purpose of what?

The security and integrity of the British Empire.

Now I've danced to your tune long enough - why don't you provide some actual evidence that the break with Japan by Britain was the result of financial elites pushing their interests? Then you can explain why Japan would have been a useful ally to British interests (you can define said interests how you like, but do specify) after the collapse of their previous alliance, because your original 'analysis' seems to just take it for granted.

[Rei Murasame]

Japan was never a useful ally to British interests and was never going to be (the interests of Britain's ruling class), I thought we agreed on that?

Are you really asking me to prove that Britain's ruling class was basically a collection of financial interests?

[Smilin' Dave]

Japan was never a useful ally to British interests

First of all I asked you to define what you thought British interests were, as I have no intention of having an inane debate where we both use different definitions and one or both of us won't actually disclose what we think we're arguing about.

Second of all I've pointed out that Japan originally served a useful purpose if for no other reason than to contain Imperial Russia. How on earth could you say that wasn't useful?

I thought we agreed on that?

That's the second time you've claimed I've agreed with you when I've said quite the opposite.

Are you really asking me to prove that Britain's ruling class was basically a collection of financial interests?

More then that, you need to show that their foreign policy was being driven by entirely by their economic interests. If they were acting for any other reason, their being "a group of financial interests" would be of no more consequence to this debate than if the British government were entirely made up of super-intelligent labradors.

[skeptic-1]

What? But you just wrote this:

If you read past the bits you've put in bold you'll see most of it boils down to political and strategic considerations. Even the economic factors you've highlighted fit into strategic considerations more than your "global finance" narrative. And why did you bold the bit about The Great Game as though it proved your point? The Great Game actually highlights that Britain wasn't always 'fighting' over economic considerations - Afghanistan wasn't exactly going to be mega bucks for the British or the Russians for example.

I in fact agree with everything you just wrote.

Not really, no. Perhaps you've missed the subtlety so I'll be a bit blunter - Britain didn't ally with Japan because it was a crappy deal for them in every way imaginable, not because of the dictates of your half baked theory

Re Para 2:

Correct ! China was by no means a military equal to Japan at the time and offered no advantage to them.

[ThirdTerm]

Imperial Japan was a colonial power and FDR was very keen on ending colonialism altogether as the Second World War progressed (i.e. the Atlantic Charter), which was the source of friction with Churchill. FDR had every incentive to undermine Japan's colonial influence in Asia and Washington demanded Japan's complete withdrawal from Manchuria prior to Pearl Harbor. President Truman inherited FDR's anti-colonial policy in the post-war era and he did not help European troops return to Asia to re-establish their colonies.

The colonial system means war. Exploit the resources of an India, a Burma, a Java; take all the wealth out of these countries, but never put anything back into them, things like education, decent standards of living, minimum health requirements--all you're doing is storing up the kind of trouble that leads to war. All you're doing is negating the value of any kind of organizational structure for peace before it begins... I'm talking about another war. I'm talking about what will happen to our world, if after this war we allow millions of people to slide back into the same semi-slavery! Don't think for a moment, Elliott, that Americans would be dying in the Pacific tonight, if it hadn't been for the shortsighted greed of the French and the British and the Dutch. Shall we allow them to do it all, all over again? Your son will be about the right age, fifteen or twenty years from now.

[Smilin' Dave]

China was by no means a military equal to Japan at the time and offered no advantage to them.

The lack of military strength could be seen as an advantage by an ambitious power, after all a militarily weaker country isn't going to be able to start trouble or defend itself if you over play your hand. The only disadvantage is if it gets into trouble, it can't look after itself. So in the same way that Japan's strength could be threatening to an ally, China's weakness at the time might have been more inviting as a potential ally.