[Michaeluj]

Let's say that the US was never involved, or something else that would allow Germany the time and resources to continue fighting. If Germany was, thereby, capable of mustering needed forces in the Eastern Front, or at least not cave in from Western pressures, what would happen? Would we have extended engagements, or an eventual sound victory, or a victory with so many conditions that it would be impractical? Would Germany have been able to benefit from the resources and industry of that nation, and improve their arsenal? Russia had a 40% larger population at the time and, according to my calculations, suffering 1.7 causalities for every dead Nazi, while supporting a comparatively worse industrial base at the time, so, would those fighting costs be maintained or not?

[Smilin' Dave]

Let's say that the US was never involved

Does no involvement mean no lend lease, and does it exclude US support for Great Britain?

while supporting a comparatively worse industrial base at the time

Are you saying that the Soviet Union's production capability was worse than Nazi Germany's during the war?

[Michaeluj]

Do the particulars necessarily matter? How about we just presume that Germany had a sufficient hold in the West to focus more resources in the East?

And well, frankly, information of GDP in that era is vague, and the only info I could find relates to the entire USSR.
http://www.onwar.com/articles/0302.htm
But, considering how the USSR is composed of all of Eastern Europe, the GDP of Russia itself would be somewhat lower than Germany's.

[fuser]

Actually particulars does matter for starters why the fuck will west leave Germany alone when she is ripping the benefits from the occupation of western Europe and Balkans. Why don't give Somalia nuclear weapons and make them conquer Australia next year.

But if Germany had rolled back her advances from western Europe warding of the pressure of another front, it would remain at massive disadvantage against USSR anyway to be crushed eventually.

[Smilin' Dave]

Do the particulars necessarily matter? How about we just presume that Germany had a sufficient hold in the West to focus more resources in the East?

The particulars matter because:
1. Just how many more resources would now available in the East?
2. Does the USSR still have access to Lend Lease which if nothing else would be potentially helpful (depending on your point of view, it could be critical). Indeed depending on your forseen scenario (say Britain is out of the war completely), the USSR might have even gotten more Lend Lease material than originally occurred.

And well, frankly, information of GDP in that era is vague, and the only info I could find relates to the entire USSR.

You would kind of want to know all resources available to the Germans and all resources available to the Soviets surely?

Anyhow, GDP aside a look at actual production statistics show that the Soviet Union was churning out considerably more material than Germany for much of the war.


Anyway, I'll put forward my own scenario and pass my judgement on that for now. In this alternate timeline the US still gets involved in WWII and eventually joins the war in Europe, but does so a year later. I think this is reasonable as it's hard to imagine the US staying out completely and forever.
- Nazi Germany in this scenario can redeploy more resources to the East, but can't transfer absolutely everything. It still has to worry about a potential US intervention and the UK is still there.
- While more troops and material are now available in the East, poor logistical support and infrastructure means that often the full force cannot be deployed, or is deployed but at less strength.
- Never the less, at times a few extra divisions here or there could perhaps have been quick important, so maybe it's not unreasonable to suggest Soviet casualties would be higher, and progress have have been comparitively slower. The major defeats outside Moscow and then at Stalingrad are pretty well inevitable, but perhaps the follow on offensives are less
- Lend Lease or something like it continues. Before the US had even entered the war, and while the USSR was still part of the 'non-aggression pact' with Nazi Germany, Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, all effort should be made to supply material to the USSR. So it's not unreasonable to suggest that would happen. This avoids any additional production bottleneck for the USSR in the alternate scenario.
- By the end of the war with the US now committed in Europe etc. we could expect that Nazi Germany is still defeated. However it is possible that Soviet forces might not have made it all the way to Berlin. On the other hand they might have ended up pushing more into the 'softer' southern areas of Germany and Austria. So in Europe the Cold War is both simplified (no fussing over the isolation of Berlin) but the strategic balance might be about the same.
- If we assume that the US still went war in the Pacific and somehow get a head start there due to the extra focus for a year, then things could be different. The Red Army might not have gotten to do its victory lap over the top of Japanese Manchukuo (sp?) and the threat of a landing on the home islands might not have eventuated. Also no divided Korea if all of these assumptions are correct. By the late 1940s China still falls to Communism... but without the Korean War or the earlier awareness of a 'threat' from the USSR in the Pacific the US might have been slower to react to the threat to Taiwan.