Superpower Nuclear Minimalism National Security Studies - Los Alamos National Laboratory - Revised July 1992 wrote:There are two main schools of nuclear strategic thought: a maximalist school, which emphasizes counterforce superiority and nuclear war-fighting capability, and a MA.D-plusschool, which emphasizes survivability of an assured destruction capability along with the ability to deliver small, limited nuclear attacks in the event that conflict occurs.
The MAD-plus strategy is the more logical of the two strategies, because the maximalist strategy is based on an attempt to conventionalize nuclear weapons, which is unrealistic.
The goals of both strategies are as follows,
1. The deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons.
2. The termination of nuclear war as quickly as possible and on terms as favorable as possible, should war occur.
3. The continued existence and political independence of the United States and its vital allies. (the West European states and Japan)
The minimalist assumptions are:
1. No political goal is worth the price of receiving a strategic nuclear attack.
2. It is impossible to limit the damage from a massive nuclear attack.
3. Escalation to massive nuclear exchanges from a lesser conflict is so likely that it must be treated as a certainty; therefore a nuclear war cannot be fought.
‘Hard core’ minimalists would prescribe that America needs only the possibility, not necessarily the certainty, of just a few (perhaps 10) nuclear weapons surviving an attack to have a secure deterrent. To ensure such destruction, the United States only needs 200 to 400 survivable 'equivalent megatons' (EMT) worth of nuclear warheads.
Strategic stability is achieved when both sides have an assured destruction capability producing a situation of mutually assured destruction or MAD. Since neither side can prevent its own destruction by striking first, neither has an incentive to attack, so the situation is stable.
Since the possibility of escalation to massive nuclear exchanges would not deter all attack a, lesser options were deemed necessary. During the Kennedy administration, the addition of limited options to the assured destruction doctrine of flexible response, according to the doctrine of flexible response, NATO might have to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.
President Reagan advanced three key principles that remain fundamental to security relationships in Europe: “trust, but verify”; no artificial divisions into “blocs” or “spheres of influence”; and “mutual assured destruction” is not an acceptable nuclear deterrence policy.
Obama wants to
TRY not being a Nuclear ready Military... contingent on certain actions being meet by other Countries.
National Security Advisor on the Future of Nuclear Policy wrote:The White House - Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Tom Donilon - National Security Advisor to the President
Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference
President Obama issued an updated Nuclear Posture Review that reduces the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture by declaring that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks against the U.S. and our allies and partners.
While there still is a narrow range of contingencies where American nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring conventional or chemical or biological weapons attacks, we have committed to take concrete steps to make deterring nuclear use the sole purpose of our nuclear forces. Our new doctrine also extends U.S. assurances by declaring that we will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.
Trying to do something and wanting to be a certain way does not change that the USA is:
1. Nuclear ready and able.
2. Has nuclear deployment assets world-wide ready to deploy when and if commanded - or individual commanders sees the eminent need to do so and can not contact command.
3. Note that the above only promises to TRY and promises not to attack NON-Nuclear Countries with nuclear arms - (as has always been the case)
All of this is just new wrapping called the
New START treaty and is just an old take on the same old nuclear arms reduction treaty. The only real reductions is that we have better nuclear ordinance now and need less ordinance to reach the needed 400 megatons.
Here is a bit of another like treaty: You might notice that there is a large emphasis on EXISTING technology and OLD technology and that the biggest restriction is that the President needs to
inform/consult with the Senate if he needs to break said treaty.
Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms wrote:
May 13, 2010
5 United states missile defense test telemetry.-Prior to entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate that the New START Treaty does not require, at any point during which it will be in force, the United States to provide to the Russian Federation telemetric information under Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol for the launch of-
(A) any missile defense interceptor, as defined in paragraph 44 of Part One of the Protocol to the New START Treaty;
(B) any satellite launches, missile defense sensor targets, and missile defense intercept targets, the launch of which uses the first stage of an existing type of United States ICBM or SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of the New START Treaty; or
(C) any missile described in clause (a) of paragraph 7 of Article III of the New START Treaty.
(6) Conventional prompt global strike.-(A) The Senate calls on the executive branch to clarify its planning and intent in developing future conventionally armed, strateg ic-range weapon systems. To this end, prior to the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate containing the following:
(i) A list of all conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon systems that are currently under development.
(ii) An analysis of the expected capabilities of each system listed under clause (i).
(iii) A statement with respect to each system listed under clause (i) as to whether any of the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty apply to such system.
(iv) An assessment of the costs, risks, and benefits of each system.
(v) A discussion of alternative deployment options and scenarios for each system.
(vi) A summary of the measures that could help to distinguish each system listed under clause (i) from nuclear systems and reduce the risks of misinterpretation and of a resulting claim that such systems might alter strategic stability.
(B) The report under subparagraph (A) may be supplemented by a classified annex.
(C) If, at any time after the New START Treaty enters into force, the President determines that deployment of conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs is required at levels that cannot be accommodated within the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty while sustaining a robust United States nuclear triad, then the President shall immediately consult with the Senate regarding the reasons for such determination.
There may be new acronyms and new "polices" but the game is still the same.
- By JohnRawls
- By ingliz
- By Doug64