[Smilin' Dave]

Israeli Troops: 415,000
Arab Troops: Over 980,000

Does this figure include Iraqi and Jordanian troops that didn't become involved until Israeli troops entered Syria?

Arab Deaths: 20,000 dead
9,000 wounded

I think you will find Rabinovich and other Israeli estimates only list 15,000 dead as the highest possible. Other western sources state less than 9,000. Paradoxically, I think your figures for the wounded are too low, with a figure of 19,000 to 35,000 wounded coming from western and Israeli sources. So still pretty bad casualty-wise, but you are off to a bad start when your facts are wrong.

Also consider that the numbers of dead don't necessarily represent the strategic gains made by either army. The less than clear strategic situation that followed the end of hostilities had an impact on the following peace settlement.

And this was an Israeli war of defense that started on a day when all the troops were celebrating Yom Kippur.

Arab cowards.

As opposed to the Six Day War, when a significant portion of the Egyptian army was in another country? Wasn't it also Ramadan in October?

[starman2003]

Of course they could have, refering to israel on it's own

Logistics wise it would have been hard to deploy Soviet troops

Even had substantial Soviet forces arrived, I don't think they could've done much better fighting Israel than the Arabs. This was especially true of their air force. Prior to the summer of 1970, Soviet advisors were very condescending toward Egyptian pilots, until their own MIGs fell into an IAF ambush, and several were lost without downing anything.

Does this figure include Iraqi and Jordanian troops that didn't become involved until Israeli troops entered Syria?

Probably includes all Arab troops at the time.

when all the troops were celebrating Yom Kippur

A C alert had been declared prior to the 6th, and they were starting to move troops and tanks to safer locations.

Arab cowards

This is absurd. See Pollack Arabs at War.

[Sayed Zakerya]

starman2003

Egypt no longer had much ability to counterattack the crossing area after the disastrous failures of the 17th, in which the 21st armored division was badly mauled and the 25th brigade practically destroyed.

On that day, the 25th brigade lost 80 Tanks out of its 90tanks power. Similarly, the 21st division was now reduced in power & no of tanks due to the continuous pressure since the 14th of oct large armoured battle.
These facts may reflect the inability of these divisions to establish a near counteract on IDF crossing area. But the 21st division in conjunction with the 16th infantry division which is a part of the 2nd Army remained tactically pressing & threatening the IDF crossing by holding the Missouri site. This fact was confirmed by the repetitive failed attacks of IDF on this site till the cease fire.
starman2003

Sharon has been credited with the initial probing which discovered the unguarded area in the 16th division's deployment just south of Tirtur road. His brigades also handily repelled the 21st's 14th and 1st brigades on the 14th, depriving the Second Army of the strength it needed to decisively resist the subsequent crossing operation.

He is responsible for the damage & kill of many IDF formations & troops through his attitude on the 8th & after the 15th of October. The crossing area was already prepared as one of the probable crossing areas by IDF in its prewar plans that were set in retaliation to Egypt Canal crossing.
Sharon division target suffred the worst IDF losses in the chineese farm east of the canal. In addition, He failed to achieve his tactical war goal of surrounding the 2nd Egyptian army. His armoured division was beated by Egyptian commandoes & Paratrooper forces south of Ismaeilia on the 20th till the 22nd.
starman2003

think Adan's total losses on the 8th were about 50 tanks; those lost near Hizayon weren't all that day. But even if Israeli losses in tanks on the 8th were 80 or more, that was still less than the 180 knocked out October 6-7 (according to Rabinovich).

Prove your 8th of Oct tanks losses. I am astonished that you are not even reflecting the Israeli numbers. General Hertzog confirm that in the First War 3 days, IDF lost 400 Tanks on the Egyptian front. While losing 90 tanks on the 6th & 7th, it lost more than 300 Tanks during its first counterattack on the 8th. According to the Egyptian sources, IDF suffered more than 400 Tanks loss in that day only.


starman2003

The IDF might've destroyed the whole Egyptian military had the war continued, alhough General Tamari doubted Israel could take on the Second Army.

You are tailoring an expected IDF triumph against solid facts that prevent its occurrence. Analysts believe that IDF can not sustain long wars. On the 24th of Oct, IDF failed to conquer Suez city or Mossiri position in the east or Ismaelya city or to achieve a further break through by sharon Division to surround the 2nd arm. The available IDF 3 armoured divisions were blocked on the Canal west bank & subjected to the Egyptian army pressure from the West, north & South. A plan of the 3rd army destruction can not be realized without risking IDF divisions safety on the Canal west bank or in front of the Syrian front.

Sephardi

And this was an Israeli war of defense that started on a day when all the troops were celebrating Yom Kippur.

This is an additional lesson of the War. When you occupy others lands , do not celebrate Yom Kippor.

Arab cowards.

what are you doing here, Sephardi? do not interfere again with grown-up discussions.

starman2003

Even had substantial Soviet forces arrived, I don't think they could've done much better fighting Israel than the Arabs.

IDF failed to keep its positions of the 5th of October, failed to secure the pass from Sinai to its semi-trapped divisions in Canal west ( Missori position was under Egyptian army control), failed to conquer Ismaeliya & Suez but you believe they can challenge the Soviet forces!! Is not that a sort of big baseless statement. The fact is that the IDF was under extrieme pressure from the Egyptian army on both Canal fronts. From the 24th of October till the 18th of January, an attrition war was imposed where more than 200 IDF troops were killed & further equipment destroyed.
IDF failed to maintain its Counter attack War objects till the 22nd of Oct. On that day, IDF lines on the Canal west bank were 50 kilometers from the Gulf of Suez. Egypt & Israel agreed to Ceasefire & UN decision 338 on that day. IDF violated the ceasefire & maintained a ground surround of the third army on the 24th of Oct. Yet, this try for reversing the War outcome was blocked by Egypt threat that unless IDF retreat to th 22nd lines, the Egyptian Army will resume its operations & open an access to the 3rd army. Fearing from the erupt further military actions, Israel agreed to hold military discussions with the Egyptians to discuss the issue of the 22nd lines. An agreement was reached on the 11/Nov/ !973( 6 point agreement) where the 3rd army was re-supplied & IDF should not alter its re-supply operations. Read the agreement Text to identify the respective status of the confornting sides:-

1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the UN Security Council.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the 22 October positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicines. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank of the Suez Canal.
5. The Israeli check-points on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate with the UN in supervising the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the Canal.
6. As soon as the UN check-points are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including wounded.

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jso ... ixpts.html
This agreement reflects IDF real status at the War end. They failed to declare a real challenge to his enemy. They raised a claimed surround & permitted re-supply without maintaining any Political return.

The 18th of Jan first disengagement agreement reflects the Egyptian army victory. Here IDF withdraw from his threatened positions west of Canal to 35 kms east without any political return.

A. Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea, and air called for by the UN Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military or para-military actions against each other.
B. The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be separated in accordance with the following principles:
1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal will be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map. All Israeli forces, including those west of the Suez Canal and the Bitter Lakes, will be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council.
3. The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament and forces.
4. The area between the Israeli line (Line B on the attached map) and the line designated as Line C on the attached map, which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla Passes are located, will be limited in armament and forces.
5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the UNEF, including the attaching of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers to UNEF, will be continued.
6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.
C. The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process. These representatives will meet no later than 48 hours after the signature of this agreement at Kilometre 101 under the aegis of the United Nations for this purpose. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this agreement. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 40 days after it begins.
D. This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

For Egypt:
General Abdul Gani al Garnasy

For Israel:
Lt. Gen. David Elazar, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army

http://middleeast.about.com/od/arabisraeliconflict/a/me080421a.htm

[starman2003]

But the 21st division in conjunction with the 16th infantry division which is a part of the 2nd army remained tactically pressing & threatening the IDF crossing by holding the Missouri site

Sharon certainly didn't think so. He strongly opposed attacking Missouri on the 21st, since it made no sense to him to attack a contained position when he could've used the forces to try to trap 2nd Army by advancing northward in the west. By the 20th, the remnants of the 16th infantry and the 21st had retreated north to Missouri after losing the Chinese Farm. They were now fully on the defensive and no longer "pressing & threatening" the crossing.

repetitive failed attacks of IDF on this site until the cease fire

In fact Sharon successfully resisted an order for another attack after the failure on the 21st.

The crossing area was already prepared as one of the probable crossing areas

Sure but only probing by Sharon's units showed that there was a gap which enabled the IDF to reach it and use it.

Sharon division target suffrd the worst IDF losses in the chineese farm

Not surprising, since his division was the first to be committed there and did the hard initial fighting.

He failed to acieve his tactical war goal of surrounding the 2nd Egyptian army

True but insufficient forces were allocated for this task. It was decided to go after the 3rd Army's rear west of the canal because the terrain there was more favorable for mobile warfare.

Prove your 8th of Oct tank losses.

Rabinovich said Adan lost about 50 on the 8th ( IIRC 40 more were lost in the 3rd Army sector) while losses on the 6-7th were about 180 tanks.

A plan of the 3rd army destruction can not be realized without risking IDF divisions safety on the Canal bank or in front of the Syrian front

Right after the war, Kabil was asked if his 4rth could break through to relieve the 3rd Army. He doubted it could be done; toward the end of the war he refused orders to try, partly because of lack of SAM cover following the local IAF suppression campaign. The 3rd was without effective air cover or supplies and the besieging forces weren't seriously threatened. As for the planned joint Syrian-Iraqi offensive on the 23rd, that too was cancelled because prospects weren't really good.

[Menes]

Egypt won the war, both syria and israel lost.

[Sayed Zakerya]

starman2003

Sharon certainly didn't think so. He strongly opposed attacking Missouri on the 21st, since it made no sense to him to attack a contained position when he could've used the forces to try to trap 2nd Army by advancing northward in the west. By the 20th, the remnants of the 16th infantry and the 21st had retreated north to Missouri after losing the Chinese Farm. They were now fully on the defensive and no longer "pressing & threatening" the crossing.

IDF general southern Command including Gen Bar-leve, Gen Gonin together with David aliazer the Chief of staff & Gen Adan insisted on conquering Missouri as it was threatening the crossing pass & area.




IDF crossing plan was set as following:-

The Israeli counterstroke, code-named Operation Gazelle, was scheduled for October 16. It called for Sharon’s division to capture the marshaling yard, the Akavish and Tirtur supply roads, Chinese Farm and a position on the Bar-Lev Line that the Israelis had dubbed Missouri

The Israelis would have to keep the Egyptians out of Chinese Farm so that Tirtur road south of it could stay open for supplies. The capture of Missouri, which dominated the heights north of the Great Bitter Lake, was important for keeping the yard and bridge out of Egyptian artillery range. Once those positions were occupied, Sharon would then move the rest of his division over the canal,

http://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-embattled-israeli-bridgehead-at-chinese-farm.htm

The Missouri position is not less important than the Chinese farm post if IDF plans to face any future Egyptian assault successfully. This post importance was emphasized by the analysis of Owen, Richard L., Major, USMC of US Marine Corps Command and Staff College in his Report with the title [Operational Valiant: Turning Of The Tide In The Sinai 1973 Arab-Israeli War].

Missouri ridge remained a problem. From that position, the Egyptians could fire, and direct fire, on the Israelis in the corridor. Sharon's remaining forces on the east bank were unable to take the position, and settled in about one kilometer north of Chinese Farm.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/ORL.htm

Professional military analysts do not share your opinion regarding the military capabilities of Gen Sharon.They believe that he has subjected his forces & IDF to unnecessary losses due to his wrong attitudes & decisions on the 8th & through the Valiant operation.
Here is one of his soldiers statement:-

A veteran of the October 1973 "Yom Kippur" war ("Harb Ramadan"), Henry Lowi
writes: "Sharon wantonly sacrificed his young soldiers and officers in crossing the Suez Canal, for the glory of Arik Sharon and to preserve the conquests of Zionism... I will always remember Arik Sharon as the son-of-a-bitch general for whom his own soldiers were truly only cannon fodder." He observes that Sharon "successfully used propaganda to serve the goals of his tactical manoeuvres", and concludeswith: "Down with Sharon-style brutality, lies and oppression!"

http://www.canpalnet-ottawa.org/Lowi_Sharon.html

An example of the losses that were caused by Sharon behavior may be detected here

In that position, Sharon defied direct orders to cease attacking the Egyptians after they had established their bridgehead. In one attack on the southern perimeter of Chinese Farm on October 9, Sharon’s 421st Armored Brigade was thrown back with the loss of 36 tanks

http://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-embattled-israeli-bridgehead-at-chinese-farm.htm

Lack of trust was created between him & other IDF commanders:-

Adan believed that Sharon wanted to hog the glory of the canal crossing, and that his men had done the job that Sharon himself had fumbled. Cooler heads prevailed, however, in the form of Maj. Gen. David Dado Elazar, the Israeli chief of staff. He decided that, Sharon will continue with the task of consolidating the bridgehead, and Bren [Adan] will cross westward according to the plan. To Sharon, who considered the decision unreasonable, Elazar said, Arik, complete the task assigned to you and then you can cross too. Sharon never was able to fully capture Missouri, nor would he have much success on the west bank when the Israeli Command finally did allow him to cross the canal.

http://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-embattled-israeli-bridgehead-at-chinese-farm.htm

starman2003

True but insufficient forces were allocated for this task. It was decided to go after the 3rd Army's rear west of the canal because the terrain there was more favorable for mobile warfare

The attack to the south was executed by Adan division. Actually, Sharon role according to the original plan was securing the passage & crossing to the west bank to either attack north to occupy Ismaeilia/surround 2nd army or to attack south to occupy Suez/surround 3rd army. After the exchange of roles with Adan, his primary role was to occupy the chinese farm & Missori then he was given the permission to attack Ismaeilya city in the west bank. He failed miserably in both.

sharon's attacks in the north, toward the town of Ismailia, gained much less ground. The Egyptian 182nd Paratroop Brigade had arrived to bolster the southern flank of the 2nd Army's on the west bank position. Matt's paratroopers and Reshev's tank bigade, in a four day battle from 18 to 22 October, were unable to make any significant progress against the Egyptian positions, and sustained heavy casualties in the attempt. By the ceasefire on the 22nd, they were still 10 kilometers south of Ismailia57.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/ORL.htm

starman2003

Right after the war, Kabil was asked if his 4rth could break through to relieve the 3rd Army. He doubted it could be done; toward the end of the war he refused orders to try, partly because of lack of SAM cover following the local IAF suppression campaign. The 3rd was without effective air cover or supplies and the besieging forces weren't seriously threatened.

True that Kabil refused to execute a counter-attack on the 22nd till the cease-fire. But that lasted only till the 30TH of Oct. At this date 5 armored brigades (600 No tanks) were pulled back from the 2nd army infantry divisions east of the Canal & pushed to the south to support Kabil division & continue surrounding IDF west of the canal. Republican Gaurds armored divisions joined the front. Since ceasefire, enormous Tanks supplies were pouring to Egypt from USSR, Jougoslavia & Algeria.
To destroy the 3rd army, IDF has to pull back divisions which is facing Syria or pull back some armored brigades from west of the Canal. Both were impossible. IAF can not execute the mission freely as the Egyptian Air force was ready to oppose such trials & protect the 3rd Army.
Israel by the War end found that the safest policy was to supply the 3rd army with logistic supplies & maintain guaranties for its troops safety west of the Canal then to withdraw 35 Kms east of the Canal without maintaining any political gains.
If this is not an Egyptian victory then what is it?

[Menes]

Rabinovich said Adan lost about 50 on the 8th ( IIRC 40 more were lost in the 3rd Army sector) while losses on the 6-7th were about 180 tanks.

Israel lost 400 tanks (destroyed not damaged) during the first 3 days of the war, Israel admitted that in october 9.
It was published in october 9 that "Israel admits the loss of 400 tanks", I read it in many newspapers like The Times, Al-Ahram, etc...
Try to read it in The Times Archive on the internet. look it up in october 9 (or 10).

[starman2003]

Menes, those figures from Rabinovich refer only to losses incurred fighting Egypt; if another hundred or so are added for Golan, then the total reaches or approximates 400.
Sayed Zakerya, I knew that Elazar and Gonen wanted Missouri taken, and I was aware that it was used to direct artillery fire onto the crossing area. But by the 21st, with the Chinese Farm captured, that was essentially all it could do. The 21st and 16th no longer had any offensive capability; both were badly mauled and could only defend. There was no longer any serious threat posed by Missouri; shelling was not decisive. It is absurd to assert that the IDF forces west of the canal were "half trapped" by Egyptian possession of it. The position did not seriously impede IDF reinforcement or resupply efforts--look at the scale of the IDF operations in the last week.
I very much doubt 600 operational tanks were made available from 2nd Army infantry divisions. There were only three such divisions and each had only 100 tanks integral to a division. Although an extra armored brigade had been added, these forces had long been wrecked; little or nothing remained of the 16th's attached 14th brigade for example. Compounding the losses in tanks were the losses of crews; Egypt didn't replace them for some time after the war.
The destruction of the 7th and 19th divisions could've been accomplished in a week (as Dupuy estimated) by air power and by logistical strangulation. The EAF couldn't provide adequate protection--that was why Egypt invested so much in SAMs. When the EAF tried to protect the 3rd, it lost 14 MIG-21s in a day--the last of the war. It is common knowledge that Israel wanted to continue the war and Egypt was eager for a cease fire.

[Sayed Zakerya]

starman2003

Menes, those figures from Rabinovich refer only to losses incurred fighting Egypt; if another hundred or so are added for Golan, then the total reaches or approximates 400.

The 400 No tanks are IDF tanks losses by the Egyptian army only in the war first 3 days according to the Israeli sources. Here is the minutes of meeting between Israel embassador & Henry Kissinger on the 9th of Oct 1973.


http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA ... ar-21a.pdf


http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA ... ar-21a.pdf


http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA ... ar-21a.pdf

In addition here is another source confirming the same number.

Israeli losses in these early battles in the Sinai were 49 planes and approximately
500 tanks.

http://www.answers.com/topic/yom-kippur-war-1

The 21st and 16th no longer had any offensive capability; both were badly mauled and could only defend. There was no longer any serious threat posed by Missouri; shelling was not decisive. It is absurd to assert that the IDF forces west of the canal were "half trapped" by Egyptian possession of it. The position did not seriously impede IDF reinforcement or resupply efforts--look at the scale of the IDF operations in the last week.

The infantry division 16 remained a very effective fighting formation till the ceasefire declaration. Its power as a defensive force was as efficient as it was through the whole War period. To execute another immediate offensive to cut the passage after the failed 17th of Oct offensive was not planned or ordered.The priority was now to sustain its positions in missory, Hamital & Televizia. the failure of IDF to occupy these till the cease fire , left its passage to the Canal west threatened of being Cut in the future upon resumption of fighting. The stubbornness of Division 16 together with the high courage & spirit of its troops damaged all IDF attacks on Missori & Hamital till the ceasefire. During this period, some of the IDF troops refused orders of attack due to the huge losses which they suffered by Division16 strong fire & solid defence.


http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/905786.html

It is to be said that the passage remained under a continuous artillary shell from division 16 posts in Missori. In addition, the Area of IDF landing at the west Canal shore ( Yard) remained under continuous shelling from the 2nd & 3rd Army artillary & rocket launchers on a minutely basis starting from the 17th till the 24th of Oct. The high rank which IDF rate the Egyptian gunners is due to the perfect shelling of the Passage & the Yard area in the Oct War. It is absurd to state that the IDF supply went on a normal basis from Sinai to Canal west through the Passage & the Yard. Israelis confessed the high losses that they suffered due to the threatened passage & the Yard. In one night, the Egyptian artillery killed 100 IDF bridge engineering soldiers. No army could sustain such losses for a long time.

I very much doubt 600 operational tanks were made available from 2nd Army infantry divisions. There were only three such divisions and each had only 100 tanks integral to a division. Although an extra armored brigade had been added, these forces had long been wrecked; little or nothing remained of the 16th's attached 14th brigade for example. Compounding the losses in tanks were the losses of crews; Egypt didn't replace them for some time after the war.

Here is a brief of the Egyptian tank numbers according to General shazli


After the Ceasefire, 250 no were left operating within the 3rd army east of Canal. Assuming total losses of 600 no tanks, then by withdrawing the 2nd army armored tanks brigades, a total power of 700-850 no tanks were surrounding IDF west of the canal. In addition to these, Artillery batteries & Infantry troops formed a strong barrier around IDF divisions. In addition, excessive supplier were pouring to Egypt to replace its damaged weapons.

The destruction of the 7th and 19th divisions could've been accomplished in a week (as Dupuy estimated) by air power and by logistical strangulation. The EAF couldn't provide adequate protection--that was why Egypt invested so much in SAMs. When the EAF tried to protect the 3rd, it lost 14 MIG-21s in a day--the last of the war. It is common knowledge that Israel wanted to continue the war and Egypt was eager for a cease fire

The Egyptian Air missile basis were pulled backward on the 16th & 17th of Oct. That means the 3rd army faught for one week till the 24th without Canal west Air missile umbrella against IAF & IDF formations without being destroyed or impaired. It was protected by its potable anti air missiles & by the EAF.
My pasted example shows you that IDF was looking for ceasefire. You are aware of coarse that IDF asked for a ceasefire on the 12th but Egypt refused. The professionals opinion is quoted here.
DAVID T. BUCKWALTER of the US Naval war college :

Despite the losses, Arab claims of victory are not farfetched. In the north, the Syrians and their allies had fought the Israelis to a standstill. In the south, Israel had isolated the Egyptian
Third Army, but it is not clear that the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/1973.pdf

[starman2003]

The 16th infantry was obviously in no shape to try to cut the corridor to the canal at the end of the war, and there's no reason to think that any attempt made after the war would've fared better than the attacks of the 17th. Of course the IDF sufferd losses from Egyptian artillery but it just wasn't decisive; the IDF moved elements of three divisions--those of Sharon, Adan and Magen--across along with adequate supplies, despite the shelling.

Assuming total losses of 600 no tanks

Sources I've seen say Egypt lost over a thousand. And I'd assume that nearly all were irrecoverable, because Egyptian armor had to pull back after the failed offensives of the 8th, 9th, 14th and 17th. By the end of the war,the 2nd Army had maybe 400 tanks left. The 16th and 21st had lost almost all of theirs. Egypt was getting replacements but so was Israel. Regardless of the number of tanks available in the west, previous experience showed that Egyptian tanks could never stand up to IDF armor. That's why the Egyptians invested a great deal in infantry antitank weapons.

the 3rd army faught for one week until the 24th without Canal west Air missile umbrella against IAF & IDF formations without being destroyed or impaired.

Apples and oranges. Until the last day or so, most of the IAF had to attack targets west of the canal, like SAMs and the 4rth's tanks. And the 7th and 19th DID have SAM coverage until the 22nd,when IAF jets struck the last batteries in the southern area. So by the 24rth onward, the 3rd would've been the prime focus of attack, without ANY meaningful air cover. Or resupply.

It was protected by its portable anti air missiles & by the EAF

As I wrote before, the EAF was not able to effectively resist the IAF or provide adequate air cover on its own. That's the reason why the Egyptians had to invest so much in SAMs. They lost 14 MIG-21s trying to protect the 3rd on the last day. After all its previous losses the EAF was approaching the end of its rope.
Sure Israel wanted a cease fire early in the war but by the 20th-24th, Egypt was desperate for a cease fire while the IDF generals wanted to avoid it.

[Menes]

Hello s-man, How are you and gomig21?

Egypt was desperate for a cease fire while the IDF generals wanted to avoid it

IDF generals wanted to avoid cease-fire in order to improve their situation on the sinai front, Syria also refused cease-fire for the same reason, so this is not a proof for an israeli victory.

Militarily Egypt lost because It suffered a net loss of territory

WWI ended with the following situation: Germany still occupying Belgium, Luxembourg, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Moravia, Galicia, vienna, Polonia, Belarus, and parts of france and denmark, but we cannot say they were victors.

Militarily Egypt lost because its casualties/tank/jet etc losses were greater

Entente's casualities and losses were also greater, but we cannot say they lost militarily.


Finally, Germany retreated due to international pressure only and signed Versaille treaty. So we can say that they were vanquished.

Allies defeated Germany, and Germany defeated Russia.

It's the same situation and the same result!

Egypt defeated Israel, and Israel defeated syria.

Both Egypt and the west were victors, although high casualities.
Both Israel and Germany were Losers, although they remained occupying Lands.
Both Syria and Russia were Losers.

Best Regards,

[starman2003]

How are you and gomig21?

Fine thank you. Welcome to the pofo forum. As you can see, I've been here a while already.

IDF generals wanted avoid cease fire

Their boss, Elazar, wanted a cease fire in the first week.

Syria also refused a cease fire

Syria actually called for one around the second day of the war.

[Sayed Zakerya]

The 16th infantry was obviously in no shape to try to cut the corridor to the canal at the end of the war, and there's no reason to think that any attempt made after the war would've fared better than the attacks of the 17th.

Here you missed my point. I am pointing to Missori importance in the post war negotiation. Its importance is not related only to the military actions prior to ceasefire but to its employment in the near future commencement of military actions. You should not underestimate its importance because the 16th div was not able to launch an armoured attack from it. The fight around it was an important step for the preparation of the new map for the future military operations.
While your description of DIV 16th status ,as not capable of cutting IDF corridor by he War end is true, it is also applicable for IDF divisions & troops facing this heroic Division. IDF troops failed to destroy this division structure or diminish it fighting capabilitie. Although it lost high numbers of Personal & Tanks, Its anti-tank infantry formations & artillery battalions remained solid & determined. This Division permitted widening the passage 3 kilometers to the north through applying a re-arranging tactic on the 19th of Oct after 4 days & 3 nights fight. They were not obliged to do this under fire. It was a completely organized tactical maneuver . During this, the Div pulled back its troops to the northern Chinese farm section to strengthen its defense lines without losing control over IDF passage.
The unsuccessfully fate of IDF attacks on DIV 16, point to the expected scenario that would have resulted if IDF tried to attack the 3rd Army after the 24th of OCT.

he IDF sufferd losses from Egyptian artillery but it just wasn't decisive; the IDF moved elements of three divisions--those of Sharon, Adan and Magen--across along with adequate supplies, despite the shelling.

Was not decisive!!! You call killing 100 No IDF soldiers over the crossing bridges in one night only (19th) as undecisive! Sorry but this is not true. You have to relate actions to its respective dates to maintain an accurate image. The Egyptian GC mistakenly, underestimated the volume & the power of the crossing IDF forces from the 15th till the 16th night. When the situation was indentified the Egyptian artillry performed on a deadly.continuos shelling on IDF crossing yard starting from the 19th till the 22nd ( The UN official ceasefire date). The effectiveness of this shelling together with the threatened passage through Canal & the poor IDF forces distribution west of the Canal, conviced Israel to retreat on the 18th of Jan. This is not a secret.

Regardless of the number of tanks available in the west, previous experience showed that Egyptian tanks could never stand up to IDF armor. That's why the Egyptians invested a great deal in infantry antitank weapons.

Study October War lessons again. The Egyptian 6 Oct offensive relied basically on 5no Infantry Divisions. The Tanks were used among these divisions.The offensive did not rely on Tanks in independent formations. The same was planned to liquidate IDF forces west of the Canal.

So by the 24rth onward, the 3rd would've been the prime focus of attack, without ANY meaningful air cover. Or resupply.

Completely isolated expectation & ignoring of many other important parameters. While you assume that the focus of new war stage would be IDF operation of 3rd army destruction. you ignored that the Egyptian GC was prearing to cut the passage from the reinforced 2nd army positions in the north with a simultanous local attacks on IDF divisions west of the Canal. You should not limit the new operations to the 3rd army front. By trying to demolish the 3rd army, IDF should prove that it can hold long defensive positions against a determined well organized multi node Egyptian attack on Canal west front. Only, the opposite was proved on the 6th of October.

by the 20th-24th, Egypt was desperate for a cease fire while the IDF generals wanted to avoid it.

What would IDF generals request to do? On the 24th, 25th & 26th, General Adan failed to conquer Suez city. His troops corps were scattered in the city streets marking his miserable defeat by DIV 19th troops. In the north, General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182. From the 19th till the 24th Sharon armoured division & paratroopers chalenged the Egyptian Commando brigades south of Ismaelya but was defeated & prevented from conquering the city or penetrating behind the second Army. On the East of Canal, IDF attacked Div 16 in Missori & the nothern sector of the chimnese farm & failed to conquer any. IDF forces confronting the 2nd army & the 3rd army in the east of the Canal failed to push them one inch backward.
How on earth you are saying that IDF generals wanted to avoid the cease fire!!!These were wiped on all their dead ends. So where do you suggest they were planning to attack?

[starman2003]

I don't think Missouri was a big asset to the Egyptians after the war. For one thing, they withdrew from the southern part of it after the IDF attack of the 21st. Also, the troops there no longer had ANY air cover. The SAMs to the west had been eliminated by Sharon's advance. IAF Skyhawks bombed Missouri unopposed, AFAIK, on the 21st.
According to Rabinovich, the 16th fell back to Missouri under IDF pressure; the Israelis completely overran the Chinese Farm on the 20th. Many Egyptian troops were surrendering.
In fact, the 3rd Army was in worse shape than the 2nd Army because it also had the problem of logistical strangulation. Dupuy estimated that had the war continued the 3rd would've lasted only a week.
Killing 100 IDF troops was obviously not decisive, because the IDF offensive continued ,isolating the 3rd Army. If shelling had been really decisive, the IDF would've abandoned the crossing operation during the war.
Sure the Egyptian infantry spearheaded the attack of the 6th. Still, they were only effective when tactically in a defensive role. Infantry also accompanied the armor on October 14 but wasn't effective then.
I doubt IDF (or IAF) focus on the 3rd Army would've been impeded much by Egyptian attacks on the corridor or on IDF forces west of the canal. The main Egyptian offensive units,the 21st and 4rth armored divisions, had been demolished by the end. Kabil doubted his ability to open the road to the trapped 3rd. He refused in part because he'd have no air cover. If the Egyptians had had adequate forces west of the canal, the IDF wouldn't have gotten as far as it did in the first place (to Suez and Adabiya).
Of course IDF generals wanted to avoid the cease fire at the end. Despite tactical setbacks at Suez and Ismailia, they had succeeded strategically, trapping the 3rd Army, so they wanted to finish it off.

[Sayed Zakerya]

I don't think Missouri was a big asset to the Egyptians after the war. For one thing, they withdrew from the southern part of it after the IDF attack of the 21st. Also, the troops there no longer had ANY air cover--------------IAF Skyhawks bombed Missouri unopposed, AFAIK, on the 21st.

The date you are stating for IDF attack on Missouri point to this site importance to IDF GCO. IDF failure to conquer this site left their logistics supplies to their forces west of the canal subjected to artillery bombardment. In addition this site together with the other 16th Div positions offer excellent axis for cutting IDF thin access to its 3 divisions west of the canal upon hostilities works resumption.
Regarding the Air Cover, you must remember that beside the anti-Air missile umbrella, the Egyptian air force was still there. If IDF got air superiority over canal , it would not spare any chance to damage the Egyptian forces. This did not happen throughout the War. Not over Missouri or over the 3rd Army.

According to Rabinovich, the 16th fell back to Missouri under IDF pressure; the Israelis completely overran the Chinese Farm on the 20th. Many Egyptian troops were surrendering.

For record, Rabinovich Yum Kippur book is one of the worst records about the War. Although he is an Israeli, he was expected to be less biased than what was included in his records.
The 16th DIV did not abandon the southern chineese farm under fire. It re-arranged its position on the 17th night & abamdoned the southern chineese farm positions in an organized manner that was never identified by the confronting IDF forces. Only, on the 18th morning, when IDF Raviv brigade attacked, they discovered that the southern Chinese farm positions were abandoned. No surrenders were ever recorded there.

In fact, the 3rd Army was in worse shape than the 2nd Army because it also had the problem of logistical strangulation.

Excuse me! IDF succeeded in cutting Cairo Suez road on the dawn of the 24th. It reached the Gulf of Suez on the night of the 24th. That means the supplies ti the Third army were never affected during the War. You must realize that till the 22nd the logistic supplies to the Third army was far safer & secured than the supplies to IDF west of the Canal. The Egyptian Artillary shells on IDF bridges & area of collection ( the Yard) did not stop since the 16th till the 2nd cease fire on the 24th. During this period , Rockets, Artillary shells, Katyousha, Napalm & air bombardments were dropped on IDF receiving area west of the canal. Hundreds of IDF personal were killed or injured due to this day/night continuous shelling to mark the trap which IDF put 3 of his armored divisions inside it.

Dupuy estimated that had the war continued the 3rd would've lasted only a week.

so how this would be fullfilled!! one week is quite a long period in modern wars. Already YK war lasted 3 weeks. How can depoy predict the outcome of another one week of war actions. For record, IDF main attacking forces were pinned in the Canal west Bank. Against the 2nd & 3rd armies, only defending forces exist. What is Dupuy pan? IDF never revealed that it had such a plan.

If shelling had been really decisive, the IDF would've abandoned the crossing operation during the war.

This decision wa about to be taken on the 15th, 16th & 17th. Starting from the 19th, it was too late to cancel it. Operation Valiant ,unintentionally, helped the Egyptian army to fulfill an important war target. This target was the kill of the most possible numbers of IDF personal. Without the crossing, the numbers would have been moderate.

The main Egyptian offensive units,the 21st and 4rth armored divisions, had been demolished by the end

Not true. While the 21st suffered large losses during the battles of the 14th, 15th till the 17th, the 4th div remained as strong as it was before the war. The one Brigade out of its 3 that suffered the impact of the 14th losses, was recovered & replaced by fresh tanks from the 1st army.

Of course IDF generals wanted to avoid the cease fire at the end. Despite tactical setbacks at Suez and Ismailia, they had succeeded strategically, trapping the 3rd Army, so they wanted to finish it off.

You do not mean strategically. You mean tactically. Yet, this is wrong again as they put their best 3 armored divisions inside a trap. I would like you to state these IDF generals who wanted to demolish the 3rd army. Source this pls.

[Oxymoron]

Why is this debate only about Israel and Egypt? The war involved Syria, Israel was fighting a two front war after a suprise attack if you consider the war in general terms then Israel won the war. Perhaps Egypt got what it wanted which was saving some face, but Syria got humiliated, plus it also ended any Egyptian antagonism of Israel.

[starman2003]

Failure to take Missouri wasn't a big problem for the IDF. Sharon opposed the attack because the position was already contained. An Egyptian offensive south from Missouri was no longer possible or stood a chance of success. Nor was shelling decisive; besides Sharon's men, the IDF was able to send Adan and Magen across, along with sufficient supplies to reach Suez and Ababiya.
The EAF, again, was far too weak to provide adequate air cover on its own. It lost 14 MIG-21s on the 24th, yet the Third was still heavily bombed. So was Missouri; IAF Skyhawks pounded it prior to the attack on the 21st.
Egyptian troops surrendered at Tirtur on the 16th and many more on the 20th, as the last of the CF was overrun.
I think the Cairo-Suez road was cut on the 22nd, or 23rd. Herzog said that the 3rd was already isolated since the 21st, when IDF tanks and guns approached close enough to cut it by fire.
Dupuy said that IAF attacks and lack of supplies, would've finished the 3rd in a week.
The 4rth armored suffered losses on the 21st, when the 6th brigade IIRC, lost at least 15 tanks. On the 22nd, one of its other brigades--not the 3rd, sent into Sinai--lost a whole battalion. There must have been other losses in the Mitznefet area and due to bombing. One Egyptian source says that by war's end, the 6th brigade had just 6 tanks left.
Magen didn't want the cease fire nor Adan; about the only one who did, according to Rabinovich, was Tamari.

[Menes]

For record, Rabinovich Yum Kippur book is one of the worst records about the War. Although he is an Israeli, he was expected to be less biased than what was included in his records.

I totally agree with u, Rabinovich is the worst book about YKW, he said that Egyptian 3rd army violated cease-fire, although US national archive stated that Israel violated cease-fire, and Kissinger encouraged them to so.

[starman2003]

Rabinovich mentioned that one of Adan's tank battalions was ordered east to the canal on the 22nd. They stopped in an area already held by Egyptian infantry--presumably part of the 3rd Army--just west of the canal. The Egyptians fired on the battalion that night, eventually forcing them to pull out. That caused the IDF to resume fighting.

[R_G]

The only reason Israel didn't invade Egypt and make it a puppet state was because the U.S. called Meir and said to stop for international reasons.

Simple as that, anyone who argues the outcome against an absolute Israeli victory seriously needs to overlook the events and battles won.