THE NEWS IN BRIEF, University of Melbourne
Melbourne, Australia, 19 June 1998, Vol 7 No 22
It is summer solstice in the USSR and General Secretary Stalin is at work by 5.45am. He is joined in his Kremlin office by commanders of the armed forces and prominent members of the Politburo.
Stalin remains in his office until 4pm while various visitors such as Beria, chief of the security services, clock in and out. At 12.05pm, Molotov, his closest colleague in the Politburo, leaves the room and returns 20 minutes later.
These administrative details mark the entry of the USSR into World War II in 1941. They are part of an extraordinary record of Stalin's office activities recently released in Russia. Everyone who visited for a period of two and a half decades from 1929 to 1953 was clocked in and clocked out in his secretarie's notebooks.
What does this information and other secret details from the Soviet archives tell us about one of the 20th century's most significant figures?
It means that we need to rewrite the political history of the Stalinist period and reassess the role of Stalin, says Stephen Wheatcroft, Associate Professor of History at the University of Melbourne.
"Much of the earlier political commentary on Stalin's period is based on very slight acquaintance with primary material from inside the system," Professor Wheatcroft says.
He cites the record of Stalin's activities during the declaration of war. When Molotov rather than Stalin announced on radio that Russia had declared war on Germany, many people jumped to the conclusion that Stalin had broken down.
The myth of Stalin as a mad dictator acting in isolation was largely perpetuated by rumour and defectors to the West, and by Stalin's own colleag ues who later were attempting to belittle their own involvement, Professor Wheatcroft says.
The Kremlin records tell a vastly different story. "The world sees Stalin as an individual tyrant but if you look at his meetings and the number of people passing through his office there appears to have been a far greater degree of collective responsibility," he says.
"We now know who Stalin's visitors were and can begin to understand how the decision-making system really worked."
Resolutions before the Politburo were redrafted in committees in meetings that typically lasted all night as members haggled over the wording of decrees.
"All of the political action was in these redrafting committees. Stalin was like a Sir Humphrey Appleby whose authority was initially based on his efficiency as a decree redrafter.
"It is clear that the Politburo was a most amazing political organisation unlike any other. A great many radical and terrifying decisions were made by this oligarchy. It was a bureaucracy gone crazy."
Dr Wheatcroft heads an ARC-funded project using these records to analyse Stalin's relationship with the major military, security, economic and cultural figures of the day. The work is part of a collaborative project with scholars in Moscow and the University of Birmingham.
In another ARC project he will use archival material recently released in Russia to revise Soviet social and economic history of the Stalin period.
This period covered one of the most dramatic and influential transformations the world has seen when the means of existence of over 100 million peasants changed from private to collective agriculture.
Dr Wheatcroft was the first Western scholar to gain access to the monthly registration data on mortality in the Ukraine and other parts of Russia which document the tragic famines that followed collectivisation from 1931 - 1933.
He claims that these famines - publicly denied by the Politburo, which suppressed census figures - were in fact the best recorded famines in history.
"What is remarkable is that the authorities were collecting and keeping mortality data which gives a detailed breakdown of the incidence of the famine through the geographic regions of the USSR."
Data interpreted by Dr Wheatcroft show mortality in Ukraine rural areas rose by up to five times the average rate. Researchers were also able to map the progress of the famines. "Results from mass secret food consumption surveys recorded peasant food consumption of as low as 830 Kcals per day in Odessa Oblast and 1100 in Kiev Oblast in the first half of 1933," he says.
Analysis shows the populous towns of Moscow and Petrograd suffered most from the early famines of 1918 - 1920, when millions of people were forced into rural areas.
In the late 1920s and early 1930s urban mortality again began rising sharply, and especially in comparison with rural mortality. At first this was mainly in the Urals, Siberia, Volga and Black Earth regions of Russia.
Ukraine, which was to become the major famine area, was relatively well protected until after the harvest of 1932. But from late 1932 and early 1933, when all other regions had been severely strained, there was a devastating increase in attention on Ukraine and the North Caucasus, where the famine reached its peak. "Some people claim the famines were purposely carried out to attack Ukrainian nationalism. Our conclusions are that there were major economic problems associated with industrialisation. The famines developed as unexpected consequences of over-ambitious plans."
Dr Wheatcroft admits that this research focuses on a very sensitive subject. "Some of the old Cold War warrior types claim that the opening up of the Soviet archives adds nothing new to the picture. Others say that this research diminishes the unthinkable Great Terror by quantifying the deaths. As a social scientist and an economic and social historian, I want to apply social scientific methodology to make sense of this tragic story," he says.
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THE NEWS IN BRIEF, University of Melbourne
Melbourne, Australia, 19 June 1998, Vol 7 No 22
http://www.unimelb.edu.au/ExtRels/Media ... /1998/319/
stalinismwasacollective.html FOR PERSONAL AND ACADEMIC USE ONLY
http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/russian/ ... /sgwab.htm
The Great Soviet Famines
in Comparison with
the Chinese Great Leap Forward Famine
Stephen Wheatcroft
Panel 46: Famines in China & the USSR
Thursday 9 July 1998
11:15 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
*** Please note new time for this panel ***
History stream
Abstract:
The famines associated with Soviet collectivisation, 1929-33, and the Chinese Great Leap Forward, 1958-61, are generally considered to have been the largest catastrophes ever to have affected any population. Measures of excess mortality in the order of 7 million for the USSR and 20 million for China, certainly make these the largest famines ever recorded. However, they both shared an important characteristic of being developmental crises, experienced by populations that were undergoing enormous economic changes and very rapid demographic transition. This paper will look in more detail at the causes and the consequences of these famines and will argue that because of the onset of demographic transition, both these societies faced a developmental crisis, which required an extraordinary response to avoid an even larger catastrophe. The nature of the developmental crisis and of the demographic transition which was taking place at these times makes it very difficult to assess what level of mortality should be taken as normal, and consequently what level should be taken as excess. This paper does not argue that the Soviet and Chinese solutions were in any way optimal, or that they were necessary. But it does suggest that comparisons with societies not facing developmental crises and that are not undergoing rapid demographic transition are rather misleading, and that we need a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of the problem.
Stephen Wheatcroft
History Department
University of Melbourne
Australia
Panel 46: Famines in China & the USSR