[getfiscal]

I have an incredibly obvious question that I just realized I never knew the answer to. The reason why the UK and France declared war on Germany in 1939 was because the ultimatum against Germany's presence in Poland had been rejected, in accordance with previous agreements by the UK and France not to allow Poland to be invaded. This was presented as a sort of firm promise that had led to an automatic declaration of war. But when the USSR invaded eastern Poland about two weeks after this, why was the same condition not met with the same result? When some level of collusion between the USSR and Germany became apparent in the Friendship pact within two weeks after that, why was some secondary condition not tripped?

I expect that answer is fairly straightforward, like perhaps the wording and intent of any agreement with Poland had against Germany did not extend to the USSR, or the more realist concerns of a long-term war strategy, but it would seem at a superficial level that both Germany and the USSR tripped the same wire from a legal or moral perspective.

[Dan]

Here's wikipedia on the subject.

On March 30, 1939, the government of the United Kingdom pledged to defend Poland, in the event of a German attack, and Romania in case of other threats. The reason for the British-issued “guarantee” of Romania and Poland was a panic-stricken ad hoc reaction to rumours (later proven to be false) of an imminent German descent on Romania in late March 1939. A German seizure of oil-rich Romania would ensure that in any future Anglo-German war, a British naval blockade would not starve Germany of oil. From London’s point of view, it was imperative to keep the oil wells of Romania out of German hands. The British “guarantee” was primarily intended to block a German move against Romania; Poland was added to the “guarantee” almost as an after-thought. Only in April 1939 did it become evident that the next German target was Poland.

The British “guarantee” of Poland was only of Polish independence, and pointly excluded Polish territorial integrity. “The reasons for the guarantee policy are nowhere more clearly stated than in a memorandum by the Foreign Office, composed in the summer of 1939, which submitted that it was essential to prevent Hitler from “expanding easterwards, and obtaining control of the resources of Central and Eastern Europe,” which would enable him “to turn upon the Western countries with overwhelming force. ”” (quotation from the book “The New Central Europe” by Stephen Borsody). The basic goal of British foreign policy between 1919-1939 was to prevent another world war by a mixture of “carrot and stick”. The “stick” in this case was the “guarantee” of March 1939, which was intended to prevent Germany from attacking either Poland or Romania. At the same time, the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax hoped to offer a “carrot” to Hitler in the form of another Munich type deal that would see the Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) and the Polish Corridor returned to Germany in exchange for a promise by Hitler to leave the rest of Poland alone.

This declaration was further amended in April, when Poland's minister of foreign affairs Colonel Józef Beck met with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. In the aftermath of the talks, a mutual assistance treaty was signed. On August 25 the Polish-British Common Defence Pact was signed as an annex to Polish-French alliance. Like the “guarantee” of March 30, the Anglo-Polish alliance committed Britain only to the defence of Polish independence. It was clearly aimed against German aggression. In case of war, United Kingdom was to start hostilities as soon as possible; initially helping Poland with air raids against the German war industry, and joining the struggle on land as soon as the British Expeditionary Corps arrived in France. In addition, a military credit was granted and armament was to reach Polish or Romanian ports in early autumn.

However, both British and French governments had other plans than fulfilling the treaties with Poland. On May 4, 1939, a meeting was held in Paris, at which it was decided that the fate of Poland depends on the final outcome of the war, which will depend on our ability to defeat Germany rather than to aid Poland at the beginning. Poland's government was not notified of this decision, and the Polish–British talks in London were continued. A full military alliance treaty was ready to be signed on August 22, but His Majesty's government postponed the signing until August 25, 1939.

At the same time secret German-Soviet talks were held in Moscow which resulted in signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 22. The full text of the treaty, including the secret protocol assuming a partition of Poland and Soviet military help to Germany in case of war, was known to the British government thanks to Hans von Herwarth, an American agent in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, Poland's government was not informed of this fact either.
[url]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_betrayal#Diplomacy[/url]

[Truthseeker]

But when the USSR invaded eastern Poland about two weeks after this, why was the same condition not met with the same result?

This should be enlightening

The USSR invaded after it was clear none of the military aggreements with Poland were being honored. The Poles held out well past the date when France promised a full-scale assault on Germany, which was promptly cancelled without telling the Poles.

The French and British had agreed to postpone offensive operations for about a year or so, what were they going to do?

I think it's pretty clear what benefits were derived, the USSR stayed officially neutral, and when Germany attacked there was no past fighting to get in the way of a new alliance.

[Ombrageux]

The guarantee of Poland had always been aimed at Germany, and in the event, the Germans were the only ones geographically the allies could relaly fight. They weren't going to declare war on a potential ally over legalities.

When the allies saw a reason to attack the USSR, they believed Soviet oil was greatly helping Hitler, they considered bombing some oil-fields in the Caucasus. Most of the time it was a pretty pointless idea.

[Thunderhawk]

Rather then looking at the treaty in its post-WW2 light of "helping Poland", it should be looked at how it originally was looked at - containment of Germany.

In that light, the actions and alliances of the war make alot more sense.

[Vasili Schmidt]

But when the USSR invaded eastern Poland about two weeks after this, why was the same condition not met with the same result?

USSR did not invade eastern Poland. The Polish state had collapsed upon the German approach of Warsaw. The USSR then marched to eastern Ukraine and Byelorussia in order to protect their eastern Ukrainian and Byelorussian blood brothers from destruction by Germans as well as oppressive Polish militarists.

When some level of collusion between the USSR and Germany became apparent in the Friendship pact within two weeks after that, why was some secondary condition not tripped?

There was never an alliance between USSR and Germany. The only agreements signed between USSR and Germany that could be considered friendly were signed with Weimar Germany in the 1920s.

American Anna Louise Strong clarifies this in "The Soviets Expected It":

"Both Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop say that Germany and not the Soviet Union originally asked for the pact; since the admission hardly adds to their prestige, one may assume that it is true."

"The nonaggression pact was not an alliance. The USSR did not sign with Hitler the type of mutual assistance pact she had offered to Britain and France. She signed a pact practically similar in form to the various nonaggression pacts she had been signing for fifteen years. It was not even mutually exclusive. It did not preclude the signing of similar pacts with Britain and France. Without violating the pact, the Soviet Union was free to oppose, even by armed force, a German attack on Turkey or Yugoslavia. She had agreed not to take part part in aggression against Germany, but had promised nothing about resisting an aggression the Nazis might start. We shall see that the Soviet Union actually did resist such aggressions without violating the pact...The USSR never became the "arsenal" for Germany in anything like the sense in which America, while still technically neutral, became the arsenal for Great Britain. America has even been the arsenal for Japan in her war against China to a far greater extent than the USSR ever was for Germany that could be classed as a war commodity was oil; the highest foreign guesses assume that the Soviets may possibly have sent as much as a million tons. America's supply of oil to Japan even under the government licensing system was more than three times as much."

Additionally, the USSR signed a non-aggression pact with France on 29 November 1932. This is self-explanotory.

The USSR signed a treaty of neutrality with Weimar Germany on 24 April 1926. It provided the following:

Article 1:

The German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics will maintain friendly contact in order to promote an understanding with regard to all political and economic questions jointly affecting their two countries.

Article 2:

Should one of the Contracting Parties, despite its peaceful attitude, be attacked by one or more third Powers, the other Contracting Party shall observe neutrality for the whole of the duration of the conflict.

I feel that the non-aggression pact signed between USSR and Germany in 1939 was genius. It had to have been the greatest diplomatic manuever of Comrade Stalin's career. It allowed the USSR to take back territory unjustly pilfered by the Polish. Our defense was significantly strengthened which was vital in the victory over fascism. Personally, I would have wanted for USSR and Germany to collaborate in wiping out the western imperialists. With the western imperialists defeated, the USSR could have then turned its attention to Germany and brought about the international socialist revolution.