Nup. As much as the Battle of Britian was a great moral boost to the Brits and a kick up the bum to the Jerries it was pretty small beer in the scheme of things
Although I agree that the defeat of the Luftwaffe over Britian was not decisive, it was a lot more significant than you say. Sometimes for reasons not immediately apparant.
The immediate effects were that Germany had to retain more troops in Western Europe. The losses sustained by the Luftwaffe plus the number of guns and aircraft needed to defend Germany against increasing RAF attacks cut the aircraft available for Russia.
You are also discounting the Empire and Commonwealth troops. They played a significant part in defeating the Italians in N. Africa and forcing Hitler to divert troops there. They also forced the invasion of Greece. Without this Germany would have been able to commit more troops to Russia.
The final significance could not have been seen at the time, but if Britain had been defeated, what you describe as one of the most significant events, Hitlers declaration of war on America, would have been of little importance. With no secure base, no big increase in bombing, no D Day, no invasion.
Even if you discount the other effects I have described, that alone make the victory over the Luftwaffe significant and far from small beer. What could America have done against Germany without a British base?
) Operation Barbarossa was achievable as long as the main theory of blitzkrieg was adhered to
This I do not agree with.
The tactic now known as Blitzkreig, was a long narow thrust, there is always a limit imposed on the depth of such a thrust, the deeper it gets the greater the supply problems. In the case of the Germans of 1941, we are not talking about a mechanised army. For Barbarossa there were 750,000 horse drawn guns and other vehicles. Every three horses used for transport needed another two to haul feed. They lost an avergage of 1000 horses a day.
They had 600,000 motor vehicles, including 3,500 fighting vehicles. The majority of supply therefore was horse drawn.
That meant that the troops meant to move up to consolidate the ground taken by the armoured colomns mainly went on foot along with horse drawn supplies.
All this worked fine in 1940, but it is less then 300 miles from Germany to the Channel, so the possible supply strains had no significant effect.
It was a very different story in Russia, vast distances, an enemy that was prepared to destroy everything of use in the German army's path and later constant threats to supply lines from partisans. Made the tactics ineffective in the long term. Add to that the winter and total ceasation of most supply and the inability of the motorised units to keep moving and the folly of attacking Russia becomes clear. The enforced lull caused by winter, enabled the Russians to regroup. The capture of Moscow would have been a big blow, may even have resulted in the end of Stalin, but the surrender of the Soviet Union? I don't think so. The historical answer of Russia to invasion is to give ground, but never give in. there is no reason to assume that the loss of Moscow would have been the end, It wasn't for Napoleon.
Perhaps we should leave the last word on Barbarossa to General Heinze Gudarian, who was among the originators of the Blitzkreig tactics.
Writing in his book "Panzer Leader"
On hearing of the decision to attack Russia, he said:
"When they spread out a map of Russia before me I could scarcely believe my eyes. Was something which I had held to be utterly impossible now to become a fact?"
About the actual plan, he said;
"Three army groups of approximately the same strength, were to attack with diverging objectives; no single clear operational objective seemed to be envisaged. Looked at from a professional point of view, this did not appear at all promising, I arranged for my Chief of Staff to convey my views to OKH, where they produced absolutely no effect"
My conclusion is similar, there was no realistic chance of a total defeat of the Soviets and that decision was the decisive error that cost Hitler the war.
senile delinquent.