Rich wrote::lol: The Soviet Union backed Israel. it was the Czechs at Stalin's directions that bailed out the Zionist war effort. Stalin backed the Jews against the Muslims, because he thought the Jews were winners and the Muslims losers.
The Soviets and the Nazis were allies. Hitler was only able to get his victories in the West because of Soviet oil and other resources of which Germany had a desperate shortage. Hitler was only able to build up and supply his huge Barbarossa invasion force because Stalin stupidly continued to supply him oil. The reason for the short period planned to knock out the Soviet Union was not due to any military analysis of the likely time needed to ensure Soviet collapse, but was the tailored to fit the predicted exhaustion of German fuel reserves. By the Autumn of 41 Germany was already having to curtail military operations. From 1942 the Germans engaged in large scale de-motorisation.
In the pathetic Communist fantasy the German army was bled white at Stalingrad. In fact casualty levels inside the city were lower than the preceding fighting outside. The Germans just did not commit the supplies or the replacements to the battle inside Stalingrad. Partly because of Halder's idiotic obsession Moscow, but largely because of the huge logistical difficulties. Even the failure of Goering's airlift after 6th Army was surrounded was not due to lack of transport planes, but lack of fuel. The lack of oil compromised every facet of the German war effort. The Germans knocked out the allied forces in France and the low countries in a matter of weeks. This was lucky for them, because they lacked both the fuel and the ammunition reserves to sustain continued offensive operations.
Okay, some of this is correct but some is not.
After World War 2 ended, historians and military leaders had a lot of time to do their research and rethink some stuff especially after 1990s and 2000s. So what you are saying is correct in regard that the Germans really needed oil and Stalin basically weaponized them by supplying the raw materials. People just don't understand how oil starved they were durring WW2. Germany produced around 1/3-1/4 of what was needed for the territory they controlled. (This includes Romanian reserves and any other reserves in their territory)
People do not understand that basically 70% of world Oil production was concentrated in 2 places: USA and USSR. Venezuela and Romania were 2nd tier of sorts.
Here is a map from 1939 for oil production:
When the war started, Oil deliveries to Germany were hampered. It was blockaded or in active fighting phase against major producers. They simply couldn't get it anywhere besides synthetics which was not enough.
This did not necessarily mean that they could not conduct military operations. Germans stockpiled a lot of oil before the war which they could happily live of for some time. As Rich said 1942 was the year when the military started really feeling the oil shortage but it is a bit more complicated then that. They did have to de-motorise from around late 1943? because they simply couldn't find enough oil for all the planes, ships, submarines etc.
The Soviets didn't win because of that though. It sure helped but the problem was a bit more severe. Germans thought that the Soviets will be defeated within 4-5 months. I mean why wouldn't they? They defeated Poland and France very fast. France was the problem durring WW1 and the USSR/RUssia was a weaker opponent in WW1. It didn't help that they didn't have clear inteligence about the USSR. Heck, as much as i understand they didn't even know who was fully in charge in the USSRs army and who the commanders were much less divisions.
They simply thought that Germans will need 150 Divisions against the Soviet 150 Divisions + 50 reserve divisions. This was wrong on so many levels. The reality was that Stalin had around 400 Divisions at the start of Barbarossa. Not all of them were near the Soviet - German border but that should give you the picture. Also note that German Divisions or not of the same size as the Soviet ones. Soviet divisions are 2 times smaller. So for simplicity sake 2 soviet divisions = 1 german one. So it was not unreasonable to think that the Germans would win easily by outnumbering the Soviets 2 to 1. The reality is that the Germans were actually outnumbered at the start of Barbarossa. Since the germans were slowed down then it also meant things like logistics had to be taken in to account which the German logisticians pointed out but were overruled because you know "We gonna steam roll them". But it happened pretty much a long the lines of what German logisticians said. You gonna advance 400 miles and then run out of oil, spare parts, food and will have to stop. This is exactly what actually happened.
When people think of Stalingrad or Moscow then they forget that German logistical lines were a nightmare. You can't put infinite amount of divisions in 1 place and then hope they will be supplied. The attack on Stalingrad and the Caucuses was important because of the oil but they couldn't commit more forces simply because the logistical lines couldn't handle shipping more resources. I mean do not forget that the Soviets pretty much went full scorched earth as soon as they understood the situation after the initial shock of the attack. This bought them time to reorganise and fight back.
Hitler was 100% correct at supporting the Caucuses approach. Germany really badly needed the oil and if the Caucuses would have been taken then they would simple process and ship oil from the Caucuses which was closer and easier to deliver from to their units. It also would have denied almost 80% of Soviet oil. That would help their oil and supply situation tremendiously.
Hitler wasn't stupid. It is easy to blame Hitler for every bad decision but now we understand that Hitler usually did the right decisions for the Nazis. He supported Caucuses attack instead of Moscow or Stalingrad for example.(Most of the German generals thought that taking Moscow would end the war. Would it really?) Even the order to stand and defend cities when Soviets were attacking was more or less correct. They learned this lesson from the Soviets. When the Soviets were retreating they also did the same thing and the reality of this was that it slowed down the Germans in the initial year greatly. It might look dumb on the surface but if the Soviets had better coordination at the start of the war then those troops might not have even been surrounded. The decision by itself was correct. If big cities don't fall then you don't have logistics because most logistical lines of any sort run through those cities. Most of the mistakes are put on Hitler but reality is that he agreed with the generals 80%? 90%? of the time. And the times when he didn't usually meant that he actually did correct dicisions compared to the generals. (Caucuses priority over Moscow, Nazis no step back order etc)
As for the end of the war. Well the Soviet just reorganised and learned to fight really well. They basically destroyed the Nazi army in the field because they became on par or better and had more resources in general. So when you hear those bullshit stories that German generals say that they were outnumbered 20 to 1 then take it with a Grain of Salt. The Soviets outnumbered the Germans basically 1.7 to 1 from 1940 till late 1944. The only reason the Soviets outnumbered them 20 to 1 in some places is because they really perfected deception, camouflage and maskirovka. It is the German generals fault that they did not understand this. Even after 1944 the soviets didn't reach 3 to 1 ratio of forces. The mistakes that the Soviets did were also the same mistakes that the French, US, UK did versus the Germans. The difference is that USSR actually had the depth to retreat, learn and reorganise but had to fight constantly during that time compared to the rest. I do not think that any of the Allies would fare better than the Soviets actually did under the circumstances.